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ABSTRACT
This thesis applies a new theory to old data. It reanalyzes VERTICALITY metaphors
for distress in Classical Hebrew using Primary Metaphor Theory. Previously, this pattern
of metaphors in Hebrew was analyzed by King (2012) within the general framework of
Conceptual Metaphor Theory. This study focuses on the ways that Primary Metaphor
Theory radically changes the organization of conceptual structure as dictated by
Conceptual Metaphor Theory and as used by King in his analysis of Hebrew VERTICALITY
metaphors. The reorganization of conceptual structure following Primary Metaphor Theory
hinges on the assumption that conceptual structures with direct, independent experiential
motivations also have independent statuses in our minds. Equally, this study focuses on
theoretical reasons for why this adjustment to the organization of conceptual structure
should be preferred.
King (2012) understood the metaphorical mapping of VERTICALITY onto DISTRESS
as existing in a hierarchy in which there were two sub-schemas—spatial and postural
VERTICALITY.

I discard the higher-level structure and treat the mappings of the “sub-

schemas” onto DISTRESS as independent structures and as construals of primary metaphors.
This affects the generalizations made over metaphorical expressions that are supposed to
be motivated by these structures. In this thesis, the reanalysis of Hebrew metaphor data is
driven by the simple application of a new theoretical framework. Though valid, data-based
arguments are made, the data themselves have not pushed the reanalysis.

xiii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Introduction
This thesis shows the development of Primary Metaphor Theory (Grady et al. 1996;

Grady 1997a, b) out of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999;
Lakoff 1993) (§1.2, chaps. 2-3) and shows how the theoretical advancements offered by
Primary Metaphor Theory can improve King’s (2012) earlier analysis of Classical Hebrew
VERTICALITY

metaphors1 for distress (e.g., being in “the depths” (Psa. 130:1), or

“collaps[ing] and fall[ing]” (Psa. 20:8))—an analysis that was based on Conceptual
Metaphor Theory (§1.3, chaps. 4-5). In this thesis, based on Primary Metaphor Theory, I
reanalyze Hebrew

VERTICALITY

metaphors in a way that makes generalizations over the

linguistic data that are different from King’s (2012) (§1.4, chap. 6).

1.2

Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Primary Metaphor Theory
Conceptual Metaphor Theory makes the important claim that “metaphor is not just

a matter of language, that is, of mere words…[O]n the contrary, human thought processes
are largely metaphorical” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 5). In this view, metaphorical

1

See Cian (2017) for a review of the literature on VERTICALITY metaphors. Though his discussion is
explicitly set within Conceptual Metaphor Theory, the literature that he reviews comes mainly from the
fields of psychology and marketing. Additional articles for consideration are Krzeszowski (1993),
Gibbs et al. (1994), and Hampe (2005).

1

expressions in language arise from and reflect metaphorical thought, the kind of thought
that maps elements from one conceptual domain onto another. Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff
& Johnson (1980) suggest that conceptual metaphors consist of coherent, relatively stable
mappings between a source and target conceptual domain. They illustrated this with the
now classic example THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS.2 Linguistic examples that are supposed to
reflect this conceptual mapping include the following (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 46):
(1)

a.

Is that the foundation of your theory?

b.

The theory needs more support.

c.

The argument is shaky.

d.

We need some more facts or the argument will fall apart.

e.

We need to construct a strong argument for that.

f.

The theory will stand or fall on the strength of that argument.

g.

So far we have put together only the framework of the theory.

A building has a foundation; its framework needs to be constructed; the whole of it needs
to be given support so that it is strong rather than shaky and so that it stands rather than
falls. Similarly, a theory has a foundation too; its framework also needs to be constructed;
the theory as a whole needs to be given support so that it is strong rather than shaky and so
that it stands rather than falls. When referring to buildings, the terms in italics are literal,
but when referring to theories, those terms are metaphorical, yet equally coherent. Lakoff
and Johnson (1980) take this as evidence for the existence of the conceptual metaphor

2

Labels for concepts and for conceptual metaphors are written in small caps throughout this thesis.
Conceptual metaphors follow the format TARGET CONCEPT IS SOURCE CONCEPT.

2

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS,

a metaphorical mapping of the domain of

BUILDINGS

onto the

domain of THEORIES. Similar evidence is given to support the existence of numerous other
conceptual metaphors.
Despite the coherence of the examples that Lakoff and Johnson used to support
their claim regarding the mapping of the domain of
THEORIES,

BUILDINGS

onto the domain of

Grady (1997a, b) pointed out three problems: First, there are gaps in the

mappings. Many salient and central aspects of the domain of BUILDINGS do not map onto
the domain of THEORIES. It is difficult to understand what French windows would be in a
theory or what it would mean for a theory to have tenants who were falling behind in their
rent. Second, there is a lack of experiential motivation that would bring the domain of
BUILDINGS

into a metaphorical relationship with the domain of THEORIES. Third, there is a

lack of distinction from other metaphors. Solid premises may be the foundation of a good
theory, but healthy families may also be the foundation of a good society, and so forth.
In answer to these problems, Grady proposes that
metaphor

composed

of

distinct

and

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS

independently

motivated

“is a

metaphorical

correspondences” called primary metaphors (1997a: 45). Specifically, Grady proposed that
THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS

derives from the combination of the more basic mappings

LOGICAL ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE

and

VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS.3

This

analysis accounts for the gaps in the mappings of THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS by suggesting
that all the mappings that do occur have to fall out from these two more basic metaphors;
the rich domains of

3

BUILDINGS

and

THEORIES

are not the structures that fundamentally

Grady actually proposed VIABILITY IS ERECTNESS (1997a: 45). I have simply changed the term from
ERECTNESS to UPRIGHTNESS but with the same intended meaning.

3

correspond. This analysis also accounts for the lack of experiential motivation discernible
in THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. Specifically, the primary metaphors LOGICAL ORGANIZATION
IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE

and

VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS

can be viewed as arising from

momentary, goal-oriented scenes that correlate our sensorimotor experiences with our
subjective judgments. Finally, this analysis also accounts for the way that
BUILDINGS

THEORIES ARE

does not make natural distinctions between itself and other similar metaphors.

The target concept VIABLE LOGICAL ORGANIZATION does not need to specify THEORIES but
may equally specify SOCIETY, and so forth; the generalization appears to be more accurate.
Additionally, it suggests that just as each primary metaphor is motivated independently, so
they are also able to function independently. While some entities may be either upright or
not upright, their physical structure (the organization of various parts) may not always be
in view. And while some states of affairs may either obtain or not obtain, they do not always
concern logical organization as in (2).
(2)

The speed record for the mile still stands/ fell/ was toppled. (Grady 1997a: 47)

1.3

King’s analysis of VERTICALITY metaphors for distress and its
problems
King (2012: 99-139) proposed the Classical Hebrew conceptual metaphor BEING IN

DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE.

Following Lakoff (1993) and others,

King understands this conceptual metaphor to exist within a larger hierarchy. Thus, King
describes the source concept THE VERTICAL SCALE (aka VERTICALITY) as an image schema
with two sub-schemas—spatial VERTICALITY (e.g., being in “the depths” (Psa. 130:1)) and
postural VERTICALITY (e.g., “collaps[ing] and fall[ing]” (Psa. 20:8)) (King 2012: 133). The
resulting metaphors are presented below. Level 1 maps the source concept

4

VERTICALITY

onto

BEING IN DISTRESS

while Level 2 maps the two sub-schemas of

VERTICALITY

onto

BEING IN DISTRESS.

(3)

Level 1: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE
Level 2: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE;
BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

As I will show in chapter five, King assumes that example (3) exists as a very small
piece within a much larger hierarchy that ultimately includes all events. Metaphorical
hierarchies as they have been defined (Lakoff 1993; Lakoff & Johnson 1999) imply that
lower levels depend to some extent on the higher levels for their structure; they are
generally characterized as “special cases” of the higher levels. Using the framework of
Primary Metaphor Theory, I point out, first, that the current analysis is inefficient (e.g., see
Grady et al. 1996: 179-80) because it requires a “huge…system” (Lakoff 1993: 227) of
entrenched conceptual structure to account for the two very basic correspondences on the
lower level. Second, it obscures the experiential basis of conceptual structure. The
experiential bases of the lower-level metaphors in example (3) are plausibly independent
and direct rather than derived from higher-level structures as suggested by the hierarchy.
Third, it obscures the nature of the relationships that exist between the metaphorical
expressions that fall under one sub-schema and those that fall under the other; it suggests
that the relationship between these conceptual metaphors (and thus, their associated
metaphorical expressions) can be defined by their mutual inheritance of higher-level
structures rather than by reference to the primary metaphors that they either do or do not
share (Grady et al. 1996: 185).

5

1.4

A new framework and its application in analyzing metaphorical
expressions
This thesis proposes a different organization of conceptual structure based on

Primary Metaphor Theory rather than the one used by King based on Conceptual Metaphor
Theory. Instead of the hierarchy in which VERTICALITY has two sub-schemas all of which
map onto DISTRESS, I treat the metaphors on Level 2 as primary metaphors (or construals
of primary metaphors already used in the literature) that, though compatible, are
independent of each other and are also independent of any higher levels. As part of this, I
discard Level 1 BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE.
Consider sentence (4):
(4)

דָּ לְ פָּ ָ֣ה ַ֭נפְ ִׁשי ִׁמּתּוגָּ ָ֑ה ַ֝ק ְי ֵ֗מנִׁ י כִׁ ְדבָּ ֶֽרָך׃
Psa. 119:28: I have collapsed with intense sorrow: make me stand upright, as your
word promises.4

In my reading of King (e.g., 2012: 131), the following hierarchy of conceptual structure is
supposed to be responsible for motivating the metaphorical expressions that use the verbs
 דלףdlp5 ‘to collapse’ in the qal and  קוםqwm ‘to make erect’ in the piel.

(5)

4

5

Level 1: The location Event Structure Metaphor
Submapping: STATES ARE LOCATIONS
Level 2: EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION
Level 3: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE
Level 4: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

All English quotations of the Bible are copied using Logos Bible Software from The Holy Bible:
English Standard Version (ESV) (Crossway Bibles 2016). Italics are added to show metaphorically
used lexical items. The Hebrew quotations are copied using Logos Bible Software from Biblia
Hebraica Stuttgartensia: SESB Version (BHS) (German Bible Society 2003).
Transliterations of Hebrew follow closely the guidelines found in The SBL Handbook of Style (SBL
Press 2014: 56-58).

6

To be clear, Levels 1-3 would all branch out in more directions than just the one shown in
this example; the hierarchy shown here is just a small sliver of a huge system.
For comparison consider Figure 1.1 which uses primary metaphors and their
unification to describe the conceptual structure that is supposed to motivate the
metaphorical expressions in sentence (4). As regards the structure represented in Figure
1.1, all the relevant conceptual structure is present; there is not more to the hierarchy than
what is shown.

Primary scene

Primary scene

FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS

unification

HAPPY IS UP

unification

A VIABLE, HAPPY PERSON IS A
FULLY UPRIGHT PERSON

Figure 1.1.

Conceptual structure based on Primary Metaphor Theory that is supposed
to motivate the metaphorical expressions from Psa. 119:28

While the implications of this organization of conceptual structure versus the one
in example (5) will be explored more thoroughly in the body of this thesis, some differences
between the two are worth pointing out here. First, when we consider that the hierarchy in
example (5) is only a sliver of a much larger hierarchical structure, then it becomes obvious
that the analysis represented in Figure 1.1 invokes altogether less structure than the one
shown in example (5). All things being equal, an application of Occam’s Razor would
7

likely prefer the structure in Figure 1.1 based on Primary Metaphor Theory over the
hierarchy in example (5) based on Conceptual Metaphor Theory.
Second, the experiential motivation (i.e., the correlations in experience called
primary scenes) of these conceptual structures is the source from which everything else
flows in Figure 1.1 following Primary Metaphor Theory. In example (5), on the other hand,
the experiential motivation is at least not shown, but as I will argue, it is simply less clear
in Conceptual Metaphor Theory.
Third, Conceptual Metaphor Theory claims that the lower-level structures are
special cases of the higher-level structures. According to the theory, nearly all metaphors
are supposed to be special cases of the Event Structure Metaphor as shown in example (5);
that is, nearly all metaphors inherit the Event Structure Metaphor which characterizes
events in terms of motion in space. If we define the relationships that can exist between
metaphors by their mutual inheritance of higher-level structures, then there is nearly always
a way to relate metaphors to one another, if by nothing else, then by their mutual inheritance
of the Event Structure Metaphor.
If, on the other hand, we define the relationships that can exist between metaphors
in terms of the primary metaphor(s) that they either do or do not share, then nearly all
metaphors and their relationships to each other are put in an entirely new light. Based on
Figure 1.1, we can say that the metaphorical expressions in Psa. 119:28 are related to all
other metaphorical expressions that share the primary metaphor FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY
IS UPRIGHTNESS;

their relationships are defined by this shared structure. This results in an

analytical generalization that groups the metaphorical expressions in Psa. 119:28 with
those of Job 21:26 (6) and Gen. 9:9 (7) based on the fact that they share the primary

8

metaphor

FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS.

primary metaphor

HAPPY IS UP6 7

Since Psa. 119:28 also reflects the

(or its negative construal), a relationship can be drawn

between the metaphorical expressions of Psa. 119:28 and other metaphorical expressions
such as Psa. 130:1 (8) that reflect HAPPY IS UP (or its negative construal).
(6)

ֵיהם׃
ֶֽ ַַ֭יחַ ד עַל־עָפָ ָ֣ר י ְִׁשכָ ָּ֑בּו ְְׁ֝ו ִר ָּ֗ ָמה ְׁתכַסֶּ֥ה ֲעל
Job 21:26: They lie down alike in the dust, and the worms cover them.

(7)

יכם׃
ֶֽ יתי ִא ְׁתכָּ֑ם וְׁ ֶֽאת־ז ְַׁרעֲכִ֖ם ַ ֶֽאח ֲֵר
ִ֖ ִ ַוא ִ֕ ֲִני הִ נְׁ ִנֶּ֥י מֵ ִ ִ֛קים את־בְׁ ִר
Gen. 9:9: “Behold, I establish [(make upright)] my covenant with you and your
offspring after you,”

(8)

ְׁהוֶֽה׃
ָ אתיָך י
ָ֣ ִ ִממַ עֲמַ ִ ִ֖קים קְׁ ָר
Psa. 130:1: Out of the depths I cry to you, O LORD!
While King’s analysis cannot see any connection8 between establishing (making

upright) a covenant in Gen. 9:9  קוםqwm ‘to make upright’ in the hiphil and the psalmist’s
plea that God make him stand upright in Psa. 119:28  קוםqwm ‘to make someone get up’,
Primary Metaphor Theory suggests a tight relationship between the two on the basis of the
shared primary metaphor FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS.

1.5

Orientation to the research and its methodology
Steen (2007) suggested that ideal research on metaphor will focus on one of eight

areas. These areas are defined by the intersection of three two-way distinctions: grammar
vs. usage, language vs. thought, and symbol vs. behavior.

6

7
8

The term UP here and elsewhere refers to VERTICAL ELEVATION. The same can be said for SPATIAL
VERTICALITY, THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE, HEIGHT, and BEING ABOVE.
This metaphor is discussed briefly in §5.5.1.
Except at the level of the Event Structure Metaphor or some unmentioned level between that and Level
2 EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION.

9

When cognitive-linguistically inspired researchers of language investigate
metaphor, they typically do so by looking at language as either grammar or
usage. Moreover, they have to make a choice in focusing on metaphor in
grammar or usage as either language, analyzing linguistic forms, or thought,
examining conceptual structures, or both. And finally, they have a further
choice in adopting either a sign-oriented, symbolic perspective on
metaphor, or a behavior-oriented, social-scientific perspective on the
processes and products of metaphor in cognition. (Steen 2007: 13)
To a large extent, this thesis investigates metaphor in grammar as thought—it examines
entrenched or conventionalized conceptual structures. It does this with a sign-oriented,
symbolic perspective—its focus is not on cognitive processing with human subjects, but
on the content and identity of conceptual structures developed in theoretical systems such
as Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Primary Metaphor Theory.
This thesis applies Primary Metaphor Theory to a set of metaphorical expressions
from King’s corpus. However, its focus is not on the expressions themselves; instead, it is
on better describing the conceptual structures that motivate those expressions. While a
better description of conceptual structure would normally flow from a closer look at
linguistic data, this thesis instead takes advantage of the way that Primary Metaphor Theory
has already refined the framework of Conceptual Metaphor Theory—influencing one’s
view on the organization of conceptual structure—then applying Primary Metaphor Theory
to King’s data, and seeing the influence it has on the analysis of his data.
Steen brings out another important methodological distinction. He says,
[I]t is of methodological importance that researchers decide either that the
analysis fixes the language data and then explores which conceptual
structures may be related to it (the ‘semasiological’ route), or that it fixes
the conceptual metaphors and then looks for potential linguistic expressions
(the ‘onomasiological’ route). (Steen 2007: 15)
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Following Steen’s distinction between the semasiological and onomasiological routes to
analysis, it is notable that King’s original analysis of metaphors for distress in Classical
Hebrew took the onomasiological route; he searched his corpus for instances of specific
image schemas (VERTICALITY,
target concept of

DISTRESS.

CONSTRAINT,

and

FORCE)

that mapped onto the specific

My thesis seeks to improve the predetermined categories of

conceptual structure into which metaphorical linguistic expressions from King’s corpus are
placed. I use Primary Metaphor Theory to make this improvement with the anticipation
that future research will complement this move with a more semasiological approach (e.g.,
looking at all the uses of  עמדʿmd ‘to stand’ and describing its metaphorical uses and the
hypothesized conceptual structure that would motivate them).
Three stages of research are commonly identified. These are data collection, data
analysis, and interpretation of the findings (see Steen 2007: 4). In this thesis, I have chosen
simply to reanalyze data that King had already collected. Methods for systematically
gathering data such as MIPVU (Metaphor Identification Procedure, Vrije Universiteit)
(Steen et al. 2010) were unnecessary. My method for analyzing the data, though primitive,
is the simple assignment of individual metaphorical expressions to the categories provided
by Primary Metaphor Theory. Finally, the interpretation of my findings again falls to
Primary Metaphor Theory as the interpretive framework.

1.6

Overview
Following the present introductory chapter, chapter two introduces Conceptual

Metaphor Theory and highlights key features particular to King’s adaptation of it. Chapter
three reviews Primary Metaphor Theory. I have adopted Grady’s theoretical framework in
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its major components. In particular, I have given special attention to four specific notions
from Grady’s work (1997a; 1997a: 100, 101-112; 1997b; 2000: 342) listed below in (9).
(9)

a.

Primary metaphors and the primary scenes from which they arise

b.

The unification of primary metaphors into complex metaphors

c.

The free specification of metaphorical source and target concepts

d.

The way that cognition is built on fundamental local processes

Grady’s perspective on conceptual structure guides much of my thinking.
Chapter four briefly summarizes the findings of King’s research on Classical
Hebrew metaphors that map VERTICALITY onto DISTRESS.
Chapter five highlights key theoretical differences between Lakoff (1993) and
Lakoff & Johnson (1999) on the one hand and Primary Metaphor Theory on the other hand.
Since King (2012) leans explicitly on Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999), I also
show that the same differences already observed between Lakoff & Johnson and Primary
Metaphor Theory can also be observed between King’s (2012) framework and the
framework of Primary Metaphor Theory.
For this reason, the first part of chapter five highlights problems with hierarchical
structure within Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson’s (1999) framework and how King’s
analysis (set within their framework) suffers the same problems. After highlighting
problems with King’s account, the latter part of the chapter constructively builds a new
analysis based on Grady’s Primary Metaphor Theory (e.g., 1997a). In so doing, I present
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my case for dividing King’s

VERTICAL

scale into the two concepts

VERTICAL ELEVATION

and UPRIGHTNESS9 while discarding the higher-level, unifying structure of VERTICALITY.
Chapter six revisits metaphorical expressions from King (2012), reconsidering
some of the same data that he considered, but this time in light of a slightly different
organization of conceptual structure. Chapter seven summarizes the argument of the thesis,
the implications of the research, and future directions.

9

These two concepts are equivalent to spatial VERTICALITY and postural VERTICALITY respectively.
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CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY

2.1

Conceptual Metaphor Theory
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) was initially developed in Lakoff and Johnson’s

book Metaphors We Live By (1980/2003). Subsequently, Lakoff, Johnson, and many others
have sharpened and developed the theory in many ways. A key feature of the theory is its stance
on the conceptual nature of metaphor. According to CMT, metaphorical thought gives rise to
metaphorical expressions in speakers, and metaphorical expressions prompt for metaphorical
thought in hearers. Metaphor is a conceptual phenomenon. Ultimately, the conceptual nature
of metaphor is defined by mappings that exist at the conceptual level between two concepts, a
source concept and a target concept.
Kövecses (2005: 5-8) outlines CMT in a fairly standard form10 by introducing
eleven important components. Areas of divergence from standard CMT will be introduced
throughout this thesis. The eleven components are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

10

Source domain
Target domain
Experiential basis
Neural structures corresponding to (1) and (2) in the brain
Relationships between the source and the target
Metaphorical linguistic expressions
Mappings
Entailments
Blends
Nonlinguistic realizations
Cultural models

As I understand it, standard CMT tends to follow closely with theoretical works by Lakoff, Johnson,
and Kövecses, especially Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003, 1999), Lakoff and Turner (1989), Lakoff
(1993), and Kövecses (2002, 2010).
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(Kövecses 2005: 5)
A classic example illustrating these components of CMT is the conceptual
metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY (Lakoff 1993). Following (1) and (2) above, theorists claim
that A JOURNEY is a concrete source domain structuring our knowledge of the abstract target
domain of

LOVE.

Evidence gathered to support the claim include coherent metaphorical

expressions such as Look how far we’ve come or We’re at a crossroads as applied to a
romantic relationship.
This mapping of

JOURNEYS

onto

ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS

has an experiential

basis (3). Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 60-73) trace the conceptual metaphor

LOVE IS A

JOURNEY back to a set of a correlations in experience that together constitute its experiential

basis. These experiences correlate a sensorimotor aspect of a scene with a subjective
judgment. They give rise to conceptual mappings called primary metaphors which can be
unified to form complex metaphors such as

LOVE IS A JOURNEY.

The primary metaphors

constituting LOVE IS A JOURNEY are as follows: PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, ACTIONS ARE
MOTIONS, A RELATIONSHIP IS AN ENCLOSURE,11

and

INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS.

The primary

metaphor PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS arises from the primary experience of “[r]eaching
destinations throughout everyday life and thereby achieving purposes (e.g., if you want a
drink, you have to go to the water cooler)” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 53). Similar
experiences give rise to the other primary metaphors underlying

LOVE IS A JOURNEY.

could potentially rephrase the individual primary metaphor mappings as

11

We

PURPOSEFUL

The kind of correlation in experience that Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 53) claim gives rise to
RELATIONSHIPS ARE ENCLOSURES does not cohere with Grady’s (1997a: 139) original description of
primary metaphor. Instead, Grady et al. (1996: 185) suggest that RELATIONSHIPS ARE CONTAINERS is a
complex metaphor composed of three different individual primary metaphor mappings.
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ACTION IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP IS MOTION TOWARD A DESTINATION
WITH A COMPANION IN A SMALL VEHICLE,

or more simply LOVE IS A JOURNEY/ROAD TRIP.

Neural structures (4) corresponding to the domain of JOURNEYS are associated with
those corresponding to the domain of LOVE. When one set of neural structures is activated,
the other is activated as well.
Furthermore, some publications (especially Kövecses 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010)
have given attention to various relationships that can exist between source and target (5).
For example, Kövecses (2005: 121-23) claims that the “range” of a target domain is the set
of source domains used to structure it. Conversely, the “scope” of any specific source
domain is the set of target domains that it structures. For some speakers, it may be that
LOVE is structured, not only by the JOURNEY domain, but also by the BUSINESS domain with

two business partners. This illustrates what may constitute the range of the target domain
of LOVE. On the other hand, the JOURNEY domain may structure, not only
LIFE, A CAREER,

LOVE,

but also

and so forth. These domains constitute the scope of the source domain of

JOURNEYS.

Thus, in an important respect, the relationship that exists between the source

domain of

JOURNEYS

JOURNEY

and the target domain of

LOVE

is the simple observation that the

domain structures several target domains including

LOVE

in a comparable way,

and that LOVE is structured by more domains than just that of JOURNEYS.
Metaphorical conceptual structures (i.e., conceptual metaphors) give rise to
metaphorical linguistic expression (6). The choice of words or phrases used to give
expression to metaphorical thought is not a determined feature of the conceptual mapping,
but word choice does frequently contribute viewpoint, evaluation, and sociolinguistic
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information to the utterance. Metaphorically used words or phrases are called metaphorical
(linguistic) expressions.
Once two domains have been conceptually linked as metaphorical source and
target, the various participants, parts, stages, linear sequence, causation, and purpose within
each domain (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 77-86) can be construed as counterparts and
mappings (7) can be formed. Kövecses gives the following example:
Conceptual metaphor:
LOVE IS A JOURNEY

Mappings:
travelers → lovers
vehicle → love relationship
destination → purpose of the relationship
distance covered → progress made in the relationship
obstacles along the way → difficulties encountered in the relationship
(Kövecses 2005: 6)
Entailments (8) can result from the elaboration of the scene prompted for by the
conceptual metaphor and its mappings. Inferences drawn from the elaborated scene are
also mapped onto the target domain. Thus, if the romantic relationship is conceptualized
as a sinking ship, then the conceptualizer can naturally infer that the lovers need to get out
of the relationship on their own or else face an even more tragic end.
The notion of a metaphoric blend (9) is borrowed from Fauconnier and Turner’s
Conceptual Integration Theory (e.g., 2002). The most salient contribution of this notion is
the fact that both source and target can contribute elements to the final metaphorical image
or scene. In fact, when conceptualizing a romantic relationship as a sinking ship, it is quite
natural to conclude that the ideal action on the part of the lovers is to get out of the
relationship rather than to sink with the ship. However, the logic of jumping ship only
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works in the target domain. The treacherous waters that may be outside the ship in the
source domain may be completely ignored in the reasoning process. This is because,
drawing from the target domain, the marked state of the lovers is that they are in a
relationship with each other. The unmarked, default relationship status is that they are not
dating, but single. Thus, not being in the ship means everything is normal regardless of
what that would mean if the source imagery were elaborated further. In addition to many
imagistic and logical features of the source domain in this example, we have seen the
projection of a feature of attention from the target domain into the metaphoric blend, thus
affecting the overall logic. The integration of blending with CMT is a theoretical question
under discussion (e.g., Grady et al. 1999; Grady 2005a; Kövecses 2002, 2010; Dancygier
and Sweetser 2014), but it is generally accepted as complementary. In Primary Metaphor
Theory, the process of unification by which multiple primary metaphors are unified to form
a single complex metaphor can easily be interpreted as an instance of blending such as
posited in Conceptual Integration Theory.
Conceptual metaphors can be “off-loaded” (see Gibbs 1999) into the culture and
realized non-linguistically (10). Social structures and behaviors can reflect conceptual
metaphors and so can the material culture. A possible example from the Hebrew Bible of
a non-linguistic realization of the metaphor

VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS

is found in Gen.

31:51-52 when Laban refers to a pillar that he has set up representing a covenant between
him and Jacob. Presumably, the upright orientation of the pillar metaphorically represents
the viability of the covenant, that the covenant is in effect. The pillar would not serve its
metaphorical purpose if the pillar were placed horizontally on the ground.
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Finally, Kövecses (2005: 7) describes cultural models (11) as “culturally specific
mental representations of aspects of the world” (see also Evans 2007: 23). Consider our
cultural model for the concept TIME. Kövecses states, “[O]ur cultural model of time is based
on (created by) the conceptual metaphor

TIME IS A MOVING ENTITY”

(Kövecses 2005: 8).

Part of Kövecses’ point here is that our concept for TIME does not exist independent of a
metaphor that structures it. Our knowledge of
creates our knowledge of

TIME

MOVING ENTITIES

constitutes and even

in some important way (see Kövecses 1999, 2005: 193-

228; Grady 2005b: 41-44). While we may have ways that we experience time directly,
central aspects of our knowledge about

TIME

are irreducibly metaphorical. Thus, our

cultural model for TIME is at least partially constituted by a set of conceptual metaphors.

2.2

Conceptual Metaphor Theory in King (2012)
The eleven basic components identified by Kövecses (2005: 5-8) remain intact in

King’s (2012) research. However, emphases do differ between them. Both King and
Kövecses are concerned with areas of cultural variation in metaphor. As I will show below,
King appears to be more sensitive to the ways in which the experiential bases of metaphor
are culturally situated. This difference plausibly accounts for the way that King uses the
experiential bases of metaphor as the primary tool for the organization, analysis, and
presentation of his data.
King organizes his discussion of distress metaphors around embodied experiences,
specifically image schemas and primary metaphors. Johnson defines an image schema as
“a recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives
coherence and structure to our experience” (Johnson 1987: xiv). For example, regarding
the embodied basis for the UP-DOWN (or VERTICALITY) image schema, Evans comments,
19

[G]ravity ensures that unsupported objects fall to the ground; given the
asymmetry of the vertical axis, we have to stoop to pick up fallen objects,
look in one direction (downwards) for fallen objects, and in another
(upwards) for rising objects. In other words, our physiology ensures that our
vertical axis, which interacts with gravity, gives rise to meaning as a result
of how we interact with our environment. (Evans 2007: 106)
Thus, it is claimed that the image schematic concept labeled VERTICALITY arises from a set
of recurring experiences that are saliently structured according to the vertical axis.
Image schemas are one kind of experiential structure King uses to organize the
metaphors he discusses. King categorizes metaphorical expressions for DISTRESS according
to the image schema(s) that the metaphorical expression reflects, whether
CONSTRAINT,

VERTICALITY,

or FORCE. Thus, a set of metaphorical expressions for DISTRESS from King’s

corpus reflect

VERTICALITY

and are grouped together, analyzed together, and presented

together (King 2012: 99-139). Another set of metaphorical expressions for DISTRESS from
King’s corpus reflect CONSTRAINT; they too are grouped together, analyzed together, and
presented together (King 2012: 140-209). The same can be said for the

FORCE

image

schema (King 2012: 210-88). King’s organization of his data according to the specific
image schemas that they reflect demonstrates the impressive ability that image schemas
have to divide up metaphorical expressions into coherent groups.
Other metaphorical expressions in King’s data are categorized according to the
primary metaphor(s) that they reflect. King follows Lakoff and Johnson who describe
primary metaphor as being “grounded in the everyday experience that links our sensorymotor experience to the domain of our subjective judgments” (2003: 255). In other words,
sensory-motor experiences and our subject judgments regarding those experiences are
repeatedly correlated in local, goal-oriented scenes. These correlations in experience give
rise to primary metaphor. King identifies primary metaphors such as BEING IN DISTRESS IS
20

BEING LOW ON THE POSTURAL SCALE
A DARK PLACE

(2012: 307) and

(2012: 126) along with BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING IN

EXPERIENCING DISTRESS IS TASTING BITTER FOOD

(2012:

97). As regards the primary metaphor BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING LOW ON THE POSTURAL
SCALE (King 2012: 126), it arises from the repeated sensory-motor experience of being less

than fully upright correlated with our subjective judgment (or emotion) of being in distress.
In sum, King organizes the metaphorical expressions for DISTRESS from his corpus
around two kinds of bodily experiences—image schemas (VERTICALITY, CONSTRAINT, and
FORCE)

and primary metaphors (subjective judgments correlating with experiences of

DARKNESS

and

BAD TASTE).

For King, the relationships that exist between otherwise

disparate metaphorical expressions are defined by the embodied experiences that they
reflect.
Regarding these embodied experiences, Kimmel observes,
The cognitive linguistic mainstream to date retains a relatively a-cultural
take on how basic cognitive forms emerge from embodiment (Sinha 1999).
What looms large are universal patterns of bodily experience [(i.e., those
that give rise to image schemas and primary metaphors)] that
developmentally prefigure conceptual discourse. (Kimmel 2005: 297)
But both Kimmel and King are interested in understanding cultural variation as well. While
Kövecses (e.g., 2005: 11-12), in an effort to comprehend cultural variation in metaphor,
moves his attention away from embodied experiences, Kimmel does the opposite and
zeroes in on embodied experiences, showing how they are situated culturally and how they
arise in culturally motivated compounds, that is, groupings of image schemas. King reflects
on his own research, saying, “Kimmel’s concept of compound image schema was
significant here in directing attention not just to the canonical universal image schema but
also to the way they have been specifically consolidated in the Hebrew language” (King
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2012: 362). Thus, the experiential basis of metaphor takes a central role in King’s
application of CMT.
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CHAPTER 3
PRIMARY METAPHOR THEORY

3.1

Primary Metaphor Theory
This chapter surveys Primary Metaphor Theory (PMT)12 which is Grady’s version

of CMT. It critiques and refines CMT as it had been described in Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff
& Johnson (1980) among others.13 Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 19-21) briefly discuss the
experiential bases of metaphor. They comment on their “ignorance in this matter” (19)
while at the same time pointing out the central role of experiential grounding in any
adequate representation of metaphor. They say, “In actuality we feel that no metaphor can
ever be comprehended or even adequately represented independently of its experiential
basis” (19). Grady’s (1997a) work on primary metaphors develops Lakoff and Johnson’s
(1980: 19-21) notion of correlated experiences as it seeks a robust definition of the
experiential bases underlying metaphor.
It is important to note that both Lakoff & Johnson and Grady claim that their
conceptual structures arise from bodily experiences.14 As I see it, Lakoff and Johnson’s
original claim regarding the experiential basis of metaphor is simply comprehended more
fully within Grady’s framework. This is because he maintains a logical connection between

12

13

14

The name Primary Metaphor Theory comes from Grady and Ascoli (2017: 29). Its unique name reflects
the unique status it has in relation to CMT. Dancygier and Sweetser also recognize its unique status and
call it Experiential Correlation Theory (2014: 25). In the same vein, Steen describes it as a “major
theoretical and empirical upheaval” (2007: 37).
Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 243-74) later explicitly align themselves with Grady on several important
points. Nevertheless, I am not aware of them having analyzed any conceptual metaphors within a
conscientiously PMT framework.
Kövecses notably moves away from this claim.
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the independent experiential bases for primary metaphors and their corresponding
independent statuses in our minds allowing the experiential bases to drive the formation of
the entire analytical framework.
To begin, Grady noted certain inadequacies in Lakoff and Johnson’s earlier
analyses of conceptual metaphors. Among other test cases, Grady holds up Lakoff and
Johnson’s (1980: 46, 52-53) proposed conceptual metaphor

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS

to

the scrutiny of the claim that it must be grounded in some kind of correlated experience.
THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS is expressed in example sentences such as The theory needs more

support, The argument is shaky, and These facts are the brick and mortar of my theory
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 46, 53). But theories and buildings do not co-occur in our
experience in any kind of salient, repeated, local, and goal-oriented scene. Grady
concludes, “There is no relevant experiential correlation of these domains, as there is for
quantity and height” (1997a: 41).
Furthermore, Grady applies a deductive logic to Lakoff and Johnson’s
ARE BUILDINGS

THEORIES

metaphor. Steen summarizes his logic in the form of a modus ponens

argument:
If theories are buildings, then theories have windows
Theories are buildings
THEREFORE
Theories have windows
(Steen 2007: 38)
But, as Grady points out, a sentence like This theory has French windows is not readily
interpretable (Grady 1997a: 40). The deduction that says that theories have windows does
not hold to be true in actual fact, a point that Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 52; cf. Steen 2007:
38) also recognize. Grady concludes, “Only a very limited subset of our basic knowledge
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about buildings is called upon by this metaphor, and we may well wonder just how this
subset is defined, or whether it is arbitrary” (Grady 1997a: 41). For Grady, the partial nature
of the mappings of one domain onto another is theoretically problematic.
Finally, Grady pointed out that “the same terms which apply to theories seem to
apply to various other target domains as well, and with very parallel meanings” (1997a:
42). Not only is it felicitous to talk about facts being the brick and mortar of a theory, but
with equal felicity, we can speak of kindness being the brick and mortar of civilized
society, or of efficiency being the brick and mortar of a company. Expressions previously
associated with the mapping of BUILDINGS onto THEORIES clearly participate in mappings
to other domains as well. According to Grady, examples such as these “call into question
the status of THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS as a distinct cognitive object” (1997a: 42).
This same descriptive issue can easily be repeated in Classical Hebrew. Consider
Isa. 1:8:
(10)

ְצּורה׃
ֶֽ ָּ וְ נֹו ְת ָּ ָ֥רה בת־צִׁ יּ֖ ֹון כְ סֻכָּ ָ֣ה בְ כָּ ָ֑רם כִׁ ְמלּונָּ ָ֥ה בְ ִׁמקְ ָּ ּ֖שה כְ ִׁ ָ֥עיר נ

Isa. 1:8: And the daughter of Zion is left like a booth in a vineyard, like a lodge in
a cucumber field, like a besieged city.15
A booth, a lodge, and a besieged city are all specific examples of structures that will not
remain upright or viable for long. Varying levels of specificity might propose themselves
to us from sentence (10). Lakoff (1993: 211-12) suggests that metaphorical mappings
should be described at the superordinate level. For example, a building or structure is a

15

Sentence (10) contains similes. While it is common to distinguish metaphor from simile on the basis of
the word ‘like’, this distinction is not relevant for the examples in this thesis. Rather, I have regarded
simile as a subset of metaphor. Both metaphors and similes involve similar conceptual structure in that
they both map a source concept onto a target concept. For an exposition of the nature and function of
simile, see Croft and Cruse (2004: 211-16).
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superordinate category that includes basic level categories such as booths, lodges, huts,
city walls, towers, fortresses, etc. (see Lakoff 1993: 211). Following this suggestion, we
could either propose the hypothetical metaphor
BUILDINGS

or perhaps simply

VIABLE POLITICAL ENTITIES ARE UPRIGHT

POLITICAL ENTITIES ARE BUILDINGS.

This latter metaphor is

particularly attractive in light of passages such as 2 Sam. 7:11-16 which refers repeatedly
to David’s kingdom as a house.16
The problem we face with this proposal, however, is that metaphorical expressions
evoking the

BUILDING

POLITICAL ENTITIES.

domain can be applied to more domains than simply that of

For example, literally speaking, houses (Ezra 3:12) and temples (Isa.

44:12) can have their foundations laid ( יָּסדyāsad and  נֹוסדnôsad respectively). This same
terminology can be used metaphorically in that a political entity can be founded, that is, it
can be enabled to exist. This is what we see in Exod. 9:18 where we see that Egypt was
founded ( נֹוסדnôsad) in a metaphorical sense. Yet in addition to mapping  יָּסדyāsad ‘to lay
foundations’ and  נֹוסדnôsad ‘to be founded’ from the
POLITICAL ENTITIES,

BUILDING

domain to the domain of

we find mappings to other domains as well. One instance of this is in

Psa. 119:152 where we find that testimonies or precepts are also able to be founded (יָּסד
yāsad). All of this leads us to conclude that the conceptual metaphor POLITICAL ENTITIES
ARE BUILDINGS

is too specific.17 A more satisfying representation of metaphorical

conceptual structure will account for the breadth of use of conventional metaphorical
expressions.

16

17

See Grady (1997b: 279-84) for an informative discussion on metaphors that have ‘house’ as the
metaphorically used lexical item.
POLITICAL ENTITIES ARE BUILDINGS would also demonstrate the problems of poor mappings and a lack
of experiential motivation as discussed in Grady et al. (1996: 177-79), Grady (1997a: 81-82; 1997b:
270-71), etc.
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In sum, Grady pointed out three problems with the older account of metaphor: (1)
conceptual metaphors such as

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS

lack experiential bases; (2) the

mappings between the domains of THEORIES and BUILDINGS are partial, not all elements in
the BUILDING domain are mapped onto the THEORIES domain; and (3) the expressions that
supposedly instantiate the conceptual metaphor

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS

also instantiate

mappings to other target domains, “and with very parallel meanings” (Grady 1997a: 42).
Together, these problems “call into question the status of

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS

as a

distinct cognitive object” (Grady 1997a: 42).
In answer to these issues, Grady proposes an analysis based on primary metaphors.
These are mappings between concepts that emerge in our patterns of thinking through
correlated experiences. We see an example of this in

APPEALING IS TASTY

in which the

experience of tasting and then our affective evaluation of that taste correlate again and
again in what Grady calls a primary scene. “[P]rimary scenes are minimal(temporallydelimited) episodes of subjective experience, characterized by tight correlations between
physical circumstance and cognitive response” (Grady 1997a: 24).
The kinds of experiences that give rise to primary metaphors in Grady’s framework
are local, “temporally-delimited” episodes. They “take no more than a ‘moment’ to unfold”
(Grady 1997a: 71). While the primary scenes motivating APPEALING IS TASTY may occur in
the context of a meal at home or in a restaurant, each with their associated scripts, the primary
scene itself is not constrained to the meal-at-home frame or to the restaurant frame.
Ultimately, the frames in which the primary scenes occur are markedly less salient or relevant
(taken as whole units) to our goals than the local, momentary experience (see especially
Grady 1997a; 1997a: 100, 101-12; 1997b; 2000: 342).

27

The conceptual links between the concepts

APPEALING

and

TASTY

arising from

repeated, correlated experiences motivate expressions such as Even the thought of going
about it that way leaves a bad taste in my mouth (Grady 1997a: 292).
UPRIGHTNESS

VIABILITY IS

is another example of a primary metaphor, one that we have already

discussed above. In both cases, the source concepts (TASTY and UPRIGHTNESS) consist of
sensorimotor experiences. Tasting is self-evidently a sensory experience; UPRIGHTNESS is
something we perceive visually as well as something we experience in our bodily posture.
As for the target concepts

APPEALING

and

VIABILITY,

they both consist of internal,

subjective judgments in response to sensorimotor experiences.
Primary target concepts stand out more for what they are not than for what they
are. They are non-sensory and they lack “image content” (i.e., sensorimotor content). For
Grady, primary target concepts are the “mental dimension” of a primary scene (Grady
1997a: 88), they are “our cognitive response to the world” (Grady 1999: 84), they are
“responses to sensory input” (Grady 1997a: 229); one way of characterizing this notion is
to say that they have “response” content (Grady 1997a: 229; 1997b; 2005b: 1606). Grady’s
original bullet-pointed list characterizing primary target concepts is as follows:
●

They lack image content [(i.e., sensorimotor content)]—or are, at
least, less tied to image content than corresponding source concepts
are.
● They refer to basic units or parameters of cognitive function, at or just
below levels to which we have direct conscious access.
(Grady 1997a: 152)
Much more can be said about primary source concepts. Consider Grady’s bulletpointed list characterizing primary source concepts:
●
●

Primary source concepts have “image content”—they are related to
bodily sensation and perception (in any modality).
This image content is at a particular, “schematic” level of specificity.
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●

Primary source concepts refer to “simple” experiences rather than
complexes of more basic scenes and concepts. Like the primary scenes
in which they figure, these are experiences which take no more than a
“moment” to unfold.
● These experiences relate in predictable ways to our goals and goaloriented actions.
● They are “self-contained” enough to be distinct, salient components of
goal-oriented scenes.
● Primary source concepts must (plausibly) refer to universal elements of
human experience.
● Primary source concepts are relational. They do not include things, such
as dogs or trees.
(Grady 1997a: 139)
The second bullet point states that the image content (i.e., sensorimotor content) is
“at a particular, ‘schematic’ level of specificity.” We can see the significance of this when
we recognize that if the metaphor is proposed at too high of a level of generality, then the
metaphor loses its distinct, consistent semantic content. UPRIGHTNESS (e.g., The record still
stands (Grady 1997a: 282)) has metaphorical associations distinct from
ELEVATION

VERTICAL

(e.g., at the height of his career). Although both concepts are positive, joining

them together under the one heading of

VERTICALITY

fails to account for the consistent,

non-overlapping semantic patterns that they exemplify. On the other hand, if the metaphor
is proposed at too specific of a level, then we lose our ability to generalize over the relevant
data. THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS accounts for the foundation of a theoretical argument but
fails to take into account the foundation of society.
The theory of primary metaphors argues persuasively for a principled
determination of the schematic level proposed for any conceptual structure reflected in
metaphorical expressions. Specifically, proposed conceptual structure must be traceable
back to correlations in experience having the characteristics of primary scenes.
Grady (2005b: 1605-07) points out that not just any correlation in experience leads
to metaphoric associations. Instead, the two correlated dimensions of the experiential scene
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must meet the following conditions: (1) One dimension must be sensory (leading to the
source concept) and the other non-sensory (leading to the target concept). See above for
descriptions of source and target concepts. (2) They must share superschematic structure.
Grady (2005b: 1606) elaborates, “The two correlated concepts must also be construable as
having the same highly schematic structure. For instance, they must both be construable as
states (viability-erect posture), as scalar properties (bright-happy), as temporal relations
(inside X-member of category X), [etc.] …” While superschemas are highly schematic
structures such as scalar properties and states, primary scenes usually instantiate very
specific scalar properties and specific states. The two correlated dimensions of the
experiential scene must share the higher-level structure. (3) They also must covary.
Producers and products frequently correlate in our experiences. But if the product ceases
to exist, the producer is typically unaffected. Correlations in experience that do not covary
may motivate metonymies but do not motivate metaphor.
Within Grady’s framework, primary metaphors are able to be unified with each
other forming complex metaphors. A classic example of this is the unification of VIABILITY
IS UPRIGHTNESS with LOGICAL ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE. When unified, these

primary metaphors become the complex metaphor
UPRIGHT PHYSICAL STRUCTURE.

VIABLE LOGICAL ORGANIZATION IS

This complex metaphor may motivate sentences such as

We need some more facts or the argument will fall apart, The argument collapsed, and We
will show that theory to be without foundation (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 46).
Finally, primary and complex metaphors are able to be freely specified. As they
stand, they are fairly schematic units of conceptual structure. They may optionally specify
or “pick out” richer and more specific instantiations of the schematic concept. UPRIGHTNESS
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may pick out the more specific concept
PHYSICAL STRUCTURE

pick out

THEORY

may pick out

TREE.

BUILDING

It is theoretically possible that

and

UPRIGHT

VIABLE LOGICAL ORGANIZATION

resulting in the conceptual metaphor

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS.

may
Free

specification of the source concept UPRIGHTNESS is apparently what motivates the specific
upright structures mentioned in sentence (10) (Isa. 1:8) above.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationships between perceptual experiences, concepts,
and language as they relate to primary metaphors.18 Primary scenes (correlations in
perceptual experiences) give rise to primary metaphors (concepts), which give rise to
metaphorical expressions from the speaker. When the hearer hears a metaphorical
expression, that expression prompts the hearer to reconstruct the conceptual structure (i.e.,
the primary metaphor) that originally gave rise to that metaphorical expression.

[for the hearer]
reflect (or prompt for
the recruitment of)
Primary
metaphors

Primary
scenes

give rise to

Figure 3.1.

Metaphorical
expressions

[for the speaker]
give rise to

Perceptual experience, concepts, and metaphorical expressions

Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate specific details that may exist in the primary metaphor
box from Figure 3.1. Figure 3.2 illustrates a primary metaphor that has not been specified,

18

The structure of Figure 3.1 is inspired by Figure 1.2 in Evans (2019: 7).
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it has not picked out a specific instantiation of its source concept UPRIGHTNESS. Figure 3.3
illustrates a primary metaphor whose source concept has been specified conceptually, it
has picked out BUILDINGS as a specific instantiation of UPRIGHTNESS. The boxes should not
be read as categories illustrating inclusion; instead, the primary source concept
(represented by the inner box) specifies a concept richer and more specific than itself
(represented by the outer box).

Source
UPRIGHTNESS

→

Figure 3.2.

Grounding

VIABILITY

{Experiences with objects (including
our own bodies) where erectness [(i.e.,
uprightness)] correlates with
functionality, health} (Grady 1997a:
68)

Binding table: Primary metaphor (VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS)

Source
UPRIGHTNESS

Target

Grounding

Target
→

{Experiences with objects (including
our own bodies) where erectness [(i.e.,
uprightness)] correlates with
functionality, health} (Grady 1997a:
68)

VIABILITY

Building

Figure 3.3.

3.2

Binding table: Specification of primary source concept
(VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS)

Conclusion
Grady’s theory of primary metaphors stands out, not only for providing a more

robust definition of the experiential bases underlying metaphor, but also for giving the
experience-types that give rise to primary metaphors a central role in structuring all
metaphorical thought and language. For Grady et al., “All metaphors either are, or are
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composed of, primitives [(i.e., primary metaphors)]” (1996: 185). In the same vein, Grady
complains that “complex domains have continually been referred to as though they, and
not the more basic domains which structured them, were the source of the terms and
concepts which were mapped by metaphorical processes” (1997a: 56). This is the issue that
he addressed in his decomposition of
metaphors

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS

VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS

and

STRUCTURE.
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into the two primary

LOGICAL ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL

CHAPTER 4
VERTICALITY IN KING (2012)

This chapter briefly summarizes the findings of King’s research on Classical
Hebrew metaphors that map VERTICALITY onto DISTRESS.

4.1

Universal factors affecting VERTICALITY
In his discussion of the

VERTICALITY

image schema, King (2012: 100) observes

that “all humans experience gravity and, from infancy, unconsciously employ numerous
processes to stay upright against it.” Culture-specific instantiations of

VERTICALITY

that

would fit an ancient setting include “drawing water from a well; building a wall; or forming
a mental image of a tent pole” (100). However, note that drawing water from a well
instantiates spatial VERTICALITY (aka

VERTICAL ELEVATION)

whereas building a wall and

forming a mental image of a tent pole more likely instantiate UPRIGHTNESS.
King cites Cienki (1998: 111) and Johnson (1987: 122-23) who suggest that the
image schemas STRAIGHT, BALANCE, and SCALE regularly co-occur with VERTICALITY. The
SCALE

schema is significant. First, it is relevant to consider whether or not it co-occurs at

all, especially with

UPRIGHTNESS

(King argues that it does (2012: 129)). Second, it is

helpful to recognize whether or not the SCALE is bounded with end-points. A bounded scale
seems more likely to occur with UPRIGHTNESS while an unbounded scale seems more likely
to occur with VERTICAL ELEVATION.
King also considers whether or not there are any values (positive or negative)
attached to different ends of the
values inhere in the primitive

VERTICAL SCALE.

VERTICALITY

“Although Hampe questions whether

image schema or just in specific embodied
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instantiations of it [(Hampe 2005: 106)], this chapter [(i.e., King 2012: 99-139)] shows
further contexts (the Hebrew conception of the universe and discourse of distress) in which
‘up’ is viewed positively and ‘down’ negatively” (King 2012: 101).

4.2

Culture-specific factors affecting VERTICALITY
In his discussion of culture-specific factors affecting the VERTICALITY image schema,

King notes that it is difficult to discuss VERTICALITY in Classical Hebrew as though it were a
single category without making the finer distinctions between spatial and postural
VERTICALITY. He says, “The English word up in he went up and he stood up cognitively links

erect posture and spatial upward movement. There is no comparable word in Hebrew, with
only derivatives of [ רוםrwm] ‘to be high’ used in both spatial and postural domains” (King
2012: 102). For this reason, he divides his discussion between spatial and postural
VERTICALITY

while maintaining that they are two special cases of the more general structure

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE (133).

Regarding spatial VERTICALITY, his discussion of the way this image schema is situated
culturally centers around the Hebrew conception of the universe. Here he describes the
prototypical location of cosmological places such as  שָּ מיִׁ םšāmayim ‘heaven, sky’ at the top of
the scale down to  ְשאֹולšəʾôl ‘Sheol’ at the bottom. Between the extreme ends of the scale are
located tangible places such as mountains, valleys, and so forth. See King 2012: 102-08 for a
full discussion. Finally, King observes that the basic-level verbs for moving up and down on
the spatial verticality scale are  עלהʿlh ‘to go up’ and  ירדyrd ‘to go down’ respectively.
King (2012: 108-10) focuses his description of postural VERTICALITY around lexical
items that prototypically prompt for it. Basic verbs for moving up or down the postural scale
include  קוםqwm ‘to get up’ for moving up the scale and  שכבškb ‘to lie down’ (if intentional)
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and  נפלnpl ‘to fall’ (if unintentional) for moving down the scale. Other lexical items
describing involuntary movement down the postural scale include  דחִׁ יdeḥî ‘stumbling’, צלע
ṣlʿ ‘to limp, stumble’, and  טולṭwl ‘to be thrown down’ (in the hophal).
Verbs that describe a person assuming a particular posture include the following:
“[ חוהḥwh ‘to bow down’] (in the ishtaphal) focuses posturally on bending over at the waist,
prostrating oneself before gods in worship, before kings, or to show respect...[ קדדqdd ‘to
bow down’] often occurs with [ חוהḥwh ‘to bow down’], …potentially highlighting putting
the head to the ground, within the posture described above” (Kings 2012: 109). Also
included are the verbs  כרעkrʿ ‘to kneel, crouch’,  כפףkpp ‘to bend down’,  שחחšḥḥ ‘to be
bowed down’, and  שיחšyḥ ‘to bring down’.  שיחšyḥ ‘to bring down’ can also be associated
with disintegration or dissolution. King (2012: 110) comments, “[M]elting, flowing, or
spreading is potentially linked to being down, in that something that spreads out also
decreases in height.”

4.3

Mappings and entailments for BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN
ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE

At various places in King’s (2012: 99-139) chapter on VERTICALITY metaphors, he
puts forward a total of six different renderings of VERTICALITY conceptual metaphors. King
understands spatial and postural VERTICALITY to be related conceptually in some important
ways (King 2012: 132). As I understand King’s position, spatial and postural VERTICALITY
exist as two distinct metaphors that are special cases of the more general conceptual
metaphor BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE (King 2012: 132-33);
he refers to them as “sub-schemas” (King 2012: 133).
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King’s corpus revealed that locations such as mountains, valleys, pits, mire, watery
deeps, and so forth are salient and frequent instantiations of the spatial geographical scale.
He states, “The most fundamental mapping here [(that is, as regards the spatial
geographical scale)] is that

EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION ”

(King 2012: 114). Later, he gives

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING IN A LOW PLACE

as a

conceptual metaphor (125-26) which may highlight the fact that many instances of BEING
DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE

are construed as identifiable physical places.

After walking through a number of examples from his corpus, King presents the
following summary of the mappings for BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL
GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE.

This summary presents mappings of participants, causation, parts,

stages, and linear sequence from the

SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE

to experiences of

DISTRESS.

Position low on geographical scale (pit, Sheol,
mighty waters)

→ Situation of distress (sickness, opposition)

Person in low position

→ Person in distress

(Agentive) cause of being low (God, hunters)

→ (Agentive) cause of distress (God, opponents)

Perceptual experience in low place (crashing
waters, darkness)

→ Perceptual experience of distress (taunts of
opponents)

(Vertical) proximity to Sheol

→ Likelihood of distress situation resulting in death

(King 2012: 122)
The cause of distress being God, hunters, and opponents, King observes that “[t]he
petitioner neither desires nor has any control over his low position, highlighting external
causes and hiding the lamenter’s own part in the situation” (2012: 119). He also notes that,
“since the only indication of a downward trajectory occurs in the fixed idiom יֹורדי בֹור
[yôrədê bôr ‘those who go down to the pit’], the ‘path’ part of the mapping is not as
elaborated as in English, where verbs like spiraling, nose-diving, crashing, sinking, going
37

downhill, and plunging elaborate the manner of worsening emotional distress” (121-22).
Thus, “the downward trajectory is elaborated in English whereas the place that is down is
elaborated in Hebrew” (138).
King identifies several entailments that follow from this set of mappings. “First, if
distress is being low, relief becomes movement upwards…Second, gravity means
descending bodies continue falling if nothing supports them and no one pulls them
up…Third, pleading for quick action uses experiences where the longer the time spent
descending, the deeper something becomes. Thus, the distance down highlights the
duration of distress” (122-24). King notes that, between English and Hebrew, “the ‘relief’
entailments differ” (137):
In English, the entailment that moving upwards is harder than moving
downwards means sufferers have to hit rock bottom and then try to climb
out, or get back up again after being knocked down. That is, prototypically,
relief requires the individual making their own, difficult ascent. Conversely,
the Hebrew corpus never refers to making one’s own ascent, on either the
postural or spatial scale. Rather, God always raises the petitioner, and the
verbs never suggest difficulty. This is entailed by the different cultural
prototypes for low places. In Hebrew, people cannot rescue themselves
from the prototypes of cistern or sea. (King 2012: 137)

4.4

Mappings and entailments for BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN
ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

Again, after walking through a number of examples from his corpus, King presents
the following summary of the mappings for

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE

POSTURAL SCALE.19

19

I take this conceptual metaphor to be identical to another he mentions, that is, BEING IN DISTRESS IS
BEING LOW ON THE POSTURAL SCALE (King 2012: 126). If there is a difference between BEING DOWN
and BEING LOW, that difference is not clear to me.
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Position low on postural scale (bowed, prostrate, low)

→

Situation of distress

Person in low posture

→

Person in distress

Agentive cause of low posture (God, enemies)

→

Agentive cause of distress (God, opponents)

Adopting low posture (falling, stumbling, being pushed)

→

Entering state of distress

Returning to upright posture

→

Relief from distress

Entailments:
The lower the posture the more intense the distress.

(King 2012: 132)
The entailment linking lower posture with more intense distress does not follow
ipso facto from the mappings. Hypothetically, there could be a binary division between
upright posture and non-upright posture. But King notes that, in Psa. 142:6[7], “the
modifier [ ְמאֹ דməʾōd ‘very’] deepens the low posture to strengthen the cry of distress” (King
2012: 129). However, it is questionable whether or not  דללdll ‘to be brought low,
diminished’ in Psa. 142:6[7] actually describes postural lowness or just spatial lowness (or
both) (cf. Isa. 19:6 where it reflects QUANTITY IS VERTICAL ELEVATION).

4.5

Summary
King’s work (2012: 99-139) is a treatment of the image schema VERTICALITY and

the ways that it maps metaphorically to DISTRESS in Classical Hebrew. For the purposes of
this thesis, the most essential point to grasp is that the postural and spatial scales, as they
map onto experiences of distress, are considered by King to be metaphors that are members
of the same more general category. That is, they share higher-level structure.
King explains, “Conceptual metaphor theory claims that metaphors fit within larger
hierarchies…For example, the metaphor EXPERIENCING DISTRESS IS TASTING BITTER FOOD
fits with the higher-level (more schematic) conceptual metaphor

LIFE EVENTS ARE

INGESTED SUBSTANCES” (2012: 97). In the case of VERTICALITY metaphors, we have at least
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three conceptual metaphors: (1) BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE,
(2) BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE, and (3) BEING
IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE.
GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE
VERTICAL SCALE.

and

THE POSTURAL SCALE

subsumed

THE SPATIAL

as “sub-schemas” (2012: 133) of

THE

Presumably, this constitutes the kind of hierarchical structure such as

King references in the statement above. Thus,
VERTICAL SCALE

King refers to

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE

is a higher-level (more schematic) conceptual metaphor under which are

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

as special cases. All three of

these conceptual metaphors are treated as entrenched units of conceptual structure.
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and

CHAPTER 5
REFINING THE ANALYSIS, I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

5.1

Introduction
In the context of metaphors with source and target concepts, King sees VERTICAL

ELEVATION

(aka SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL VERTICALITY) and UPRIGHTNESS (aka POSTURAL

VERTICALITY)

as source concepts that are subsumed under the more general concept

VERTICALITY.

The pivotal role that Grady gives to primary metaphors in the structuring of

metaphorical terms and concepts also calls for a reevaluation of King’s hierarchical
organization of
UPRIGHTNESS

VERTICALITY

concepts. I propose that

VERTICAL ELEVATION

and

are independent concepts and that there is therefore no formal connection

between the them.
My proposal contradicts a hierarchical model of conceptual structure such as what
King (e.g., 2012: 97) espouses (likely drawing on Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson
(1999)). For this reason, in order to refine King’s analysis, §5.2 evaluates Lakoff (1993)
and Lakoff & Johnson’s (1999) hierarchical model. My evaluation follows critiques
previously presented in Grady et al. (1996) and Grady (1997a). They suggest that Lakoff’s
(1993) hierarchical model is inefficient in its analysis, that it assigns meaning to sets of
metaphorical expressions for which there is no linguistic evidence, and that it does not
capture the “more direct cognitive motivation” (Grady et al. 1996: 180) for some mappings
whose place in the hierarchy implies a derived status. In §§5.3-4, I extend these critiques
to King’s organization of

VERTICALITY

concepts. Using the framework of PMT, §5.5

constructs refined categories into which we can place the very same metaphorical
expressions that King (2012) previously analyzed.
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5.2

The organization of conceptual structure
In this section, I evaluate what Feyaerts (2000) terms “the inheritance hypothesis.”

This hypothesis originates in Lakoff (1993) who gives the following description:
“Metaphorical mappings do not occur isolated from one another. They are sometimes
organized in hierarchical structures, in which ‘lower’ mappings in the hierarchy inherit the
structures of the ‘higher’ mappings” (1993: 222).
Lakoff’s influence on King (cf. King 2012: 9, footnote 48) can be seen in the
following statement: King says, “Conceptual metaphor theory claims that metaphors fit
within larger hierarchies…For example, the metaphor EXPERIENCING DISTRESS IS TASTING
BITTER FOOD

fits within the higher-level (more schematic) conceptual metaphor

EVENTS ARE INGESTED SUBSTANCES”

LIFE

(2012: 97). This statement is instructive for us as we

consider the relationship that exists for King between

VERTICALITY

and its two “sub-

schemas” (King 2012: 133)—spatial and postural VERTICALITY.

5.2.1 Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999) on hierarchies and inheritance
Inheritance in standard CMT is a mechanism “whereby one metaphor shares and
elaborates the structure of a more general one—as

LOVE IS A JOURNEY

inherits the more

general LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS (Lakoff 1993)” (Grady 1997a:
14). However, the higher-level structures do not always share everything with the lowerlevel structures. Lakoff and Johnson describe inheritance using the example of the way the
concept ELECTRIC CAR inherits the more general concept CAR. They say, “We ‘inherit’ all
the information we can from our prototypical idea of a car, provided it is consistent with
the new information” (1999: 201, emphasis added). If some higher-level element is
inconsistent with new, lower-level structure, then the higher-level structure does not share
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that element with the lower-level structure. Grady summarizes “current theory” in a way
that concurs with Lakoff and Johnson’s caveat regarding consistency as a condition for
sharing structure. He uses the qualifier “all (or nearly all).” He says, “In current theory, a
metaphor inherits another metaphor if the first includes all (or nearly all) the structure of
the second, plus some additional structure—e.g., LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE
JOURNEYS

inherits ACTION IS BODILY MOTION” (Grady 1997a: 71).

Lakoff illustrates hierarchical structure and inheritance with example (11) below:
(11)

Level 1: The event structure metaphor
Level 2: A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY
Level 3: LOVE IS A JOURNEY; A CAREER IS A JOURNEY
(Lakoff 1993: 222)
Level 1 is the Event Structure Metaphor. This is a complex of mappings that

characterizes events in terms of motion in space. Lakoff and Johnson list the mappings of
the Event Structure Metaphor as follows:
(12)

20

States Are Locations (interiors of bounded regions in space)
Changes Are Movements (into or out of bounded regions)
Causes Are Forces
Causation Is Forced Movement (from one location to another)
Actions Are Self-propelled Movements
Purposes Are Destinations
Means Are Paths (to destinations)
Difficulties Are Impediments To Motion
Freedom Of Action Is The Lack Of Impediments To Motion
External Events Are Large, Moving Objects (that exert force)
Long-term, Purposeful Activities Are Journeys
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 179)20

These mappings for the Event Structure Metaphor are updated from Lakoff’s (1993: 222-23) original
proposal. The set of mappings listed above includes two additional mappings—Causation Is Forced
Movement (from one location to another) and Freedom Of Action Is The Lack Of Impediments To
Motion. Conversely, Lakoff’s (1993: 222-23) original proposal included one mapping that was not
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The eleven mappings in this metaphor do not hold equal status. In Lakoff and
Johnson’s description, some mappings are logically prior to other mappings, and the other
mappings have a more derived status:
States are conceptualized as locations (bounded regions in space). This
elementary mapping fixes the possibility for what change and causation can
be. The Changes Are Movements metaphor combines with States Are
Locations to construe a change in an entity as the movement of that entity
from one location to another. The Causes Are Forces metaphor combines
with these to provide a conceptualization of causation as the forced
movement of an entity from one location to another.
With these metaphorical parameters fixed, the other mappings are pretty
well determined. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 194-95)
Ultimately, lower-level mappings inherit the Event Structure Metaphor. But when
we say that a lower-level structure inherits the higher-level Event Structure Metaphor, it is
not a single mapping that is inherited by the lower levels, but the whole complex of
mappings in whatever ways it is consistent with the new information added to the lower
levels.
For the second level in Lakoff’s hierarchy in example (11) above, we understand
that life is a long-term, purposeful activity; and since we already have the mapping LONGTERM, PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS,

we are able to have at a lower level the

mapping A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY. Level 2 inherits all the mappings of the Event
Structure Metaphor, but it also adds more structure of its own. In the structure of Level 2,
the person leading a life is a traveler, events generally are specified as life events, and
purposes are life goals (see Lakoff 1993: 223).

included in Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999: 179) later list; that mapping is “Expected progress is a travel
schedule; a schedule is a virtual traveler, who reaches prearranged destinations at prearranged times”
(Lakoff 1993: 223).
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Finally, regarding Level 3, Lakoff explains,
Just as significant life events are special cases of events, so events in a love
relationship are special cases of life events. Thus, the LOVE IS A JOURNEY
metaphor inherits the structure of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. What is
special about the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is that there are two lovers
who are travelers and that the love relationship is a vehicle. The rest of the
mapping is a consequence of inheriting the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor.
(1993: 223)
According to Lakoff (1993: 218-28) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999: 194-201), there
are two branches of the Event Structure Metaphor—the location branch (which we saw
above in example (11)) and the object branch. These two branches are called metaphorical
duals and are related to each other in that the primary difference between them is the
perceptual reversal of figure and ground. In the location Event Structure Metaphor, states
are construed as locations and purposes as destinations. Thus, we have
LOCATIONS, PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS,
REACHING A DESIRED LOCATION.

and by extension,

STATES ARE

ACHIEVING A PURPOSES IS

In the object Event Structure Metaphor, attributes are

construed as possessions and purposes as desired objects. Thus, we have ATTRIBUTES ARE
POSSESSIONS, PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OBJECTS,
ACQUIRING A DESIRED OBJECT.

and by extension ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS

In one case, the ego moves to the desired location; in the

other, the desired object moves to be co-located with (and thus possessed/acquired by) the
ego. As for the relationship between the two branches of the Event Structure Metaphor,
there is no neutral Event Structure Metaphor; a choice is always made between one figureground organization and the other. Further details are available in Lakoff and Johnson
(1999: 198) along with proposed mappings for the object Event Structure Metaphor.
This cognitive ability to reverse the figure and the ground in the Event Structure
Metaphor affects all metaphors lower down in the hierarchy.
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LOVE IS A JOURNEY

inherits

the location Event Structure Metaphor, and accordingly, events are construed as the ego’s
movement through space. At the same time,
PARTNERSHIP

LOVE IS A JOURNEY

has the dual

LOVE IS A

in which events are construed as acquisitions or losses (i.e., movements) of

the stationary ego’s possessions. I represent Lakoff’s description of this hierarchy in
example (13):
(13)

Level 1: The object Event Structure Metaphor
Submapping: ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS ACQUIRING A DESIRED OBJECT
They just handed him the job.
Level 2: A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A BUSINESS
He has a rich life.
Level 3: LOVE IS A PARTNERSHIP
marriage contract
(see Lakoff 1993: 226-27)
Lakoff concludes his discussion of hierarchies and figure-ground reversals with the

following statement: “The major point to take away from this discussion is that metaphor
resides for the most part in this huge, highly structured, fixed system, a system anything
but ‘dead.’ Because it is conventional, it is used constantly and automatically, with neither
effort nor awareness. Novel metaphor uses this system, and builds on it, but only rarely
occurs independently of it” (Lakoff 1993: 227-28, emphasis added). It is assumed that
metaphorical expressions such as We’ve hit a dead-end street as applied to a romantic
relationship (reflecting

LOVE IS A JOURNEY)

and marriage contract (reflecting

LOVE IS A

PARTNERSHIP) both instantiate the huge, highly structured, fixed system with its complexes

of metaphors, figure-ground reversals, hierarchies, and inheritance of higher-level
structures.
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5.2.2 Grady et al. (1996) on the Event Structure Metaphor
Grady et al. (1996) argue that many of the submappings in the Event Structure
Metaphor are better taken as independent, both because their experiential bases are
independent and because it produces a simpler account of the data. This has implications
for the “shape” of conceptual structure and the magnitude of inheritance hierarchies.
Grady et al. (1996) comment that, “Current theory often invokes huge metaphorical
complexes in order to account for basic correspondences, and corresponding linguistic
evidence, which seem to be explainable more directly on their own terms” (Grady et al.
1996: 179). They demonstrate their claim using the following example:
(14)

He’s weighed down by lots of assignments. (Grady et al. 1996: 179)

Regarding sentence (14), they summarize an analysis implied in Lakoff (1993). They say,
“The current analysis is that this use of weighed down has the meaning it does because it
is an instance of the mapping

DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS,

DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION,

which is a special case of

which in turn is a submapping of the ACTION

IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION [(location)] branch of the EVENT STRUCTURE METAPHOR… (see

Lakoff, 199[3])” (Grady et al. 1996: 179).
Rather than invoking such a large metaphorical complex to account for sentence
(14), they suggest a simpler, more efficient, and motivationally more transparent account:
“We suggest instead that

DIFFICULTIES/OBLIGATIONS ARE BURDENS

is a metaphoric

primitive [(i.e., a primary metaphor)]. Such a mapping has independent motivation:
enduring difficulties and discharging obligations require effort, attention, and expenditure
of energy, just as supporting heavy weights does, independent of whether the burdened
person is trying to move” (Grady et al. 1996: 183).
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An important point highlighted by Grady et al. (1996) is that there is no linguistic
evidence in sentence (14) that the heavy weights are construed as impediments to motion.
This contrasts with any account invoking Lakoff’s Event Structure Metaphor. According
to a Lakoffian account, DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS ultimately inherits the location branch
of the Event Structure Metaphor in which events are construed in terms of the ego’s
movement through space. Thus, the BURDEN in DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS is necessarily
a special case of

IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION.

DIFFICULTIES/OBLIGATIONS ARE BURDENS
MOTION

Grady et al. (1996: 180) suggest that

is compatible with

ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED

but question its status as an instance of ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION. They

state that “linguistic contexts in which there is no direct evidence for interpreting heavy
weights as impediments to motion are not hard to come by” (Grady et al. 1996: 183).
In sum, Grady et al. (1996) argue that many submappings in the Event Structure
Metaphor arise independently and function independently. Rather than assuming a “huge,
highly structured, fixed system” (Lakoff 1993: 227), linguistic evidence, efficiency of
analysis, and motivationally transparent mappings suggest that many metaphorical
expressions are best accounted for with the mappings of individual primary metaphors
without any need to invoke the whole complex of mappings known as the Event Structure
Metaphor.

5.2.3 Grady on hierarchies, inheritance, and complex metaphors
Grady’s approach to hierarchies and inheritance is connected integrally to the
broader framework of PMT. Refer to §3.1 for an overview. Grady states that “metaphorical
‘inheritance’ (as discussed in Lakoff 1993, for instance) can be interpreted in the Primary
Metaphor framework as the relationship between a complex metaphor and the more basic
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metaphors of which it is composed” (Grady 1997a: 112). When considering
LOGICAL ORGANIZATION IS UPRIGHT PHYSICAL STRUCTURE

VIABLE

and VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS,

“the former is a compound of which the latter is a component (and, as it happens, a primary
metaphor)” (Grady 1997a: 71). When two or more primary metaphors are unified to form
a complex metaphor, “[a]t its simplest,21 the result…is simply the list of all
correspondences and propositions from the component metaphors” (Grady 1997a: 48).

5.2.4 The “shape” of conceptual structure in Grady (1997a) and Lakoff (1993)
and Lakoff & Johnson (1999)
It is important to highlight that the highest level of metaphorical structure for Grady
is the primary metaphor. Every primary metaphor has its own unique experiential basis.
Not surprisingly then, primary metaphors are assumed to maintain a fundamentally
independent status; they may optionally unify with other primary metaphors but can always
function on their own as well (see Grady et al. 1996: 185).
In contrast, the highest level of metaphorical structure presented in Lakoff (1993)
is the Event Structure Metaphor either as the location or the object branch. Immediately
after listing the eleven submappings of the location Event Structure Metaphor, Lakoff and
Johnson state, “This is a single, complex mapping with a number of submappings. The
source domain is the domain of motion-in-space. The target domain is the domain of
events. This mapping provides our most common and extensive understanding of the
internal structure of events, and it uses our everyday knowledge of motion in space to do
so” (1999: 179). Despite the fact that Lakoff and Johnson recognize many of the Event

21

I understand Grady to have used the phrase “[a]t its simplest” because emergent mappings may result
from the unification. These emergent mappings are comparable to Conceptual Integration Theory’s
emergent features that may arise in blended spaces after composition (see Fauconnier and Turner 2002).
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Structure Metaphor’s submappings to be primary metaphors (1999: 179), their
fundamental status in Lakoff and Johnson’s framework remains as “submappings,” as
members of a more complex whole, rather than as independent units of conceptual
structure.
Consider the following example sentences from Grady (1997a) in light of the two
models of conceptual structure:
(15)

The tax burden on people in their bracket has grown considerably. (Grady 1997a: 104)

(16)

The burden of emotional instability has kept her from getting very far in life.
(Grady 1997a: 105)

From the perspective of PMT, these two sentences could potentially prompt for the same
complex metaphor—DIFFICULTIES

IN ACHIEVING PURPOSES ARE BURDENS THAT MAKE

REACHING A DESTINATION DIFFICULT.
PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS

and

This complex metaphor stands as a unification of

DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS.

linguistic evidence in sentence (15) that

Nevertheless, there is no

PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS

is part of the

underlying conceptual structure. For this reason, sentence (15) and sentence (16) (without
further contextual clues) have different analyses even at the highest level of conceptual
structure. Sentence (15) is analyzed as arising from the primary metaphor
ARE BURDENS,

DIFFICULTIES

while sentence (16) is analyzed as arising from the unification of

DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS

with

PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS.

This is possible only

because the primary metaphors are independent mappings in PMT.
In contrast, within standard CMT as laid out by Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff &
Johnson (1999), sentences (15) and (16) have the same structure at the highest level, i.e.,
they both reflect the location Event Structure Metaphor. An issue that arises from Lakoff
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(1993) and Lakoff & Johnson’s (1999) account is that the source domain for sentence (15)
is necessarily viewed in the context of motion in space, a point for which there is no
linguistic evidence. Second, Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson’s (1999) account
suggests that a “huge, highly structured, fixed system” (Lakoff 1993: 227) is necessary to
account for the basic correspondences reflected in sentences (15) and (16). This system
includes the Event Structure Metaphor which Lakoff points out is “a rich and complex
metaphor whose parts interact in complex ways” (Lakoff 1993: 220). However, Grady et
al. wonder “whether there might be an analysis which requires less structure” (1996: 180).
Finally, many of the submappings of the Event Structure Metaphor, being that they are
primary metaphors, have their own, independent experiential bases. The implications of
this fact do not appear to be fully appreciated in Lakoff and Johnson’s framework.
Figures 5.1-5.2 illustrate the way that conceptual structure has a different “shape”
in Lakoff and Johnson as compared with Grady.22 In Lakoff and Johnson, there is a single,
complex mapping at the highest level of conceptual structure. From there, lower-level
mappings branch out. This is illustrated by Figure 5.1. In Grady, multiple basic,
independent mappings may be at the highest level of conceptual structure, each with their
own independent experiential bases; these mappings are primary metaphors. Primary
metaphors are able to unify to form complex metaphors, thus bringing multiple units of
conceptual structure into one. The “shape” of Grady’s organization of conceptual structure
is illustrated by Figure 5.2.

22

Figures 5.1-5.2 place independent units of conceptual structure (i.e., the Event Structure Metaphor and
primary metaphors) at the highest levels. Lower levels are considered to be dependent on the higher
levels.
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The location Event Structure Metaphor
Submapping: DIFFICULTIES ARE
IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION

DIFFICULTIES ARE
FEATURES OF THE
TERRAIN

DIFFICULTIES
ARE BURDENS

MARRIAGE/CAREER
DIFFICULTIES ARE:

MARRIAGE/CAREER
DIFFICULTIES ARE:

MARRIAGE/CAREER
DIFFICULTIES ARE:

-BRICK WALLS
-CORNERS

-TIGHT SPACES
-HILLS
-BOGS
-JUNGLES

-LOADS
-WEIGHTS

DIFFICULTIES
ARE
BLOCKAGES

DIFFICULTIES
ARE
COUNTERFORCE
S

EXPERIENCING
DIFFICULTY IS
EXPERIENCING LACK OF
AN ENERGY SOURCE

MARRIAGE/CAREE
R DIFFICULTIES
ARE THE
EXPERIENCES OF:

-BEING PUSHED
-BEING LED
AROUND BY THE
NOSE
-BEING HELD BACK

Figure 5.1.

The “shape” of conceptual structure
with inheritance hierarchies
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MARRIAGE/CAREER
DIFFICULTIES ARE
THE STATES OF:

-BEING OUT OF GAS
-BEING OUT OF
STEAM

Primary scene

Primary scene

PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS

DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS

unification

unification

DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING
PURPOSES ARE BURDENS
THAT MAKE REACHING A
DESTINATION DIFFICULT

specification

EMOTIONAL DIFFICULTIES THAT
PREVENT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF
LIFE PURPOSES ARE BURDENS
THAT MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD
A DESTINATION DIFFICULT

Figure 5.2.
The “shape” of conceptual structure
with primary and complex metaphors

5.2.5 Local experience-types
Grady asks, “Is conceptual knowledge organized into strongly entrenched and
tightly coherent wholes—e.g., domains, frames, etc.—or more loosely distributed in
assemblies that can be more or less entrenched, but whose elements are available for
individual recruitment?” (2000: 342). Grady argues for the latter perspective and ultimately
gives “locally-defined experience-types” (1997a: 98) a foundational role in the
organization of conceptual knowledge.
Local experience-types are (1) “instantaneous” (1997a: 87), taking “no more than
a ‘moment’ to unfold” (1997a: 139), and (2) basic, “not decomposable into smaller, more
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local mappings” (1997a: 70). Within Grady’s framework, primary scenes are by definition
local (e.g., see Grady 1997a: 177). Primary metaphors, since they arise from primary
scenes, are therefore not decomposable into other subsidiary metaphorical structures nor
do they map rich domains that cannot plausibly trace back to local, momentary scenes.
We have seen how the primacy of local experience-types has numerous
implications for complexes of mappings such as the Event Structure Metaphor. It also has
similarly dramatic implications for metaphors involving rich domains such as ACQUIRING
IDEAS IS EATING

(Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 241-43). Whenever we are dealing with rich

domains, it is the local mappings of primary metaphors that structure those domains rather
than the rich domains themselves. Grady points this out, saying, “[C]omplex domains have
continually been referred to as though they, and not the more basic domains which
structured them, were the source of the terms and concepts which were mapped by
metaphorical processes” (Grady 1997a: 56). An important consequence of this for the
analyst is that any metaphor supposedly arising from correlations in experience that is not
a primary metaphor or simple composition of primary metaphors23 is simply not valid.
While in our case the kinds of local experiences that we are concerned with are
primary scenes, it is helpful to see them in their capacity as local experience-types. One
exceptional feature of this kind of experience is that it produces much stronger conceptual
and neural connections than connections arising from more extensive experiences (such as
the connections of home with family or of dinner with family, connections that are neither
instantaneous nor basic and that are not necessarily universal). In other words, the

23

This is not intended to imply that processes such as elaboration and specification cannot come into play.
These processes, however, do not undermine the conceptual “entities” that feed them (see Grady 1997a: 13).
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metaphorical connections arising from primary scenes are markedly more entrenched than
other kinds of conceptual connections (see Grady 2000: 342). This makes logical sense of
the foundational role that PMT gives to primary metaphors in structuring metaphorical
terms and concepts.
All in all, the centrality of local experience-types as the primary contributors of
metaphorical conceptual structure and the building blocks for meaning construction has
important implications for how we will evaluate King’s organization of conceptual
structure in which

VERTICALITY

has two sub-schemas—postural and spatial geographical

VERTICALITY.

5.3

King’s VERTICALITY hierarchy
There are at least three relevant metaphorical conceptual mappings presented in

King (2012: 99-139). These are (1)
SCALE,

(3)

(2)

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE,

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE.

hierarchy.
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and

Figure 5.3 illustrates the

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING
DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN
ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL
SCALE

Figure 5.3.

VERTICALITY

hierarchy

King does not address issues regarding whether all three of these structures have
their own unique experiential bases or whether they somehow depend on the single primary
scene associated with the higher-level BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL
SCALE.

While his discussion implies an assumption that experiential correlations motivate

each of the structures individually, he neither expresses this explicitly nor discusses why
this would be or how it would work.
Furthermore, he does not give any detailed discussion regarding the relationships
that exist between each of the structures. Do the lower-level structures add extra structural
content? Or are they mere instantiations of the higher-level structure? If they do add extra
structural content, what is the added structure and how is it differentiated from the inherited
structure? If they are mere instantiations of the higher structure, can expressions reflecting
the postural scale replace expressions reflecting the spatial scale without significant
semantic effects. These questions highlight difficulties with King’s hierarchy as it stands.
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The following discussion demonstrates three points regarding King’s perspective
on the structures in Figure 5.3. First, King sees each of these mappings as structures that
are cognitively real. Second, the mappings from Figure 5.3 constitute hierarchical structure.
Third, despite difficulties in reconciling King’s

VERTICALITY

hierarchy with Lakoff’s

views, the following discussion presents evidence indicating that King understands his
hierarchy to fit within a broadly Lakoffian hierarchical view of metaphor.
There are a number of different ways in which King indicates that he sees each of
the three mappings in Figure 5.3 as cognitively real. These include, first, the fact that he
presents each of the mappings with their own unique labels, mapping BEING DOWN ON THE
VERTICAL SCALE, BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE, and BEING DOWN ON
THE POSTURAL SCALE

onto BEING IN DISTRESS. Second, his presentation and analysis of the

Hebrew mappings is divided into two sections corresponding to the two sub-schemas of
VERTICALITY.

Third, he verbally indicates the uniqueness of each of the mappings. He

expresses the unique status of the higher-level metaphorical mapping BEING IN DISTRESS IS
BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE,

referring to the source concept as a “basic image

schema[]” (King 2012: 11) and also pointing to evidence demonstrating “the entrenchment
and conventionality of BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE” (King
2012: 133). He also expresses the unique status of the lower-level metaphorical mappings
by referring to them as “sub-schemas” (King 2012: 133). Fourth, in King’s presentation
and analysis of the mappings, he presents a unique set of mappings and entailments for
each of the sub-schemas. Fifth, when construed positively, King brings attention to the fact
that postural VERTICALITY maps onto certain target concepts such as “solidity and stability,
or the readiness to act” (King 2012: 208) that spatial VERTICALITY does not. Similarly, King
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associates

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE

the more basic correspondence

with

EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION

(King 2012: 114). While not precluding the possibility, King does nothing to suggest that
this more basic metaphorical correspondence has any comparable association with the
postural scale. Sixth, King presents evidence that the linguistic examples shown throughout
his presentation (King 2012: 99-139) “indeed represent significant conceptual
metaphors”24 (King 2012: 132). King shows that the

VERTICALITY

conceptual metaphors

are able to make consistent generalizations over polysemy patterns of the lexical items
instantiating them, “whether spatial-geographic or postural” (King 2012: 132). The
“variety of verbs and nouns [for which these generalizations can be made] demonstrates
the entrenchment and conventionality of
VERTICAL SCALE”

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE

(King 2012: 133). He also presents similar kinds of evidence

demonstrating the way these conceptual structures provide an ability to make consistent
generalizations over inference patterns, showing how certain inference patterns can be the
same for “both scales” (King 2012: 133). In summary, it is relatively clear that King sees
each of the three conceptual metaphors presented in Figure 5.3 above as distinct, though
related structures that are cognitively real.
King expresses his view regarding the hierarchical organization of metaphorical
conceptual structure in general and its existence in larger-scale systems in the following
statement:
[T]he existence of a conceptual metaphor is supported by its coherence with
larger-scale metaphorical systems. Conceptual metaphor theory claims that
metaphors fit within larger hierarchies…For example, the metaphor

24

Note the plural here: “…conceptual metaphors” (King 2012: 132, emphasis added).
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EXPERIENCING DISTRESS IS TASTING BITTER FOOD

(more schematic) conceptual metaphor
SUBSTANCES. (King 2012: 97)

fits with the higher-level

LIFE EVENTS ARE INGESTED

Recall that, in the location Event Structure Metaphor, events are construed as the
ego’s movement to a desired location. In contrast, in the object Event Structure Metaphor,
events are construed as a desired object’s movement to be co-located with (and thus,
possessed/acquired by) the stationary ego. In one case, the ego moves from one location to
another; in the other case, a desired object moves to or from the ego. King’s example in
the above excerpt in which LIFE EVENTS ARE INGESTED SUBSTANCES appears to assume the
object branch of the Event Structure Metaphor.
Yet similarly, King also places spatial

VERTICALITY

within the Event Structure

Metaphor framework. Under the section heading BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON
THE

SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE (King 2012: 114), he begins by saying, “The most

fundamental mapping here is that
LOCATION”

EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL

(King 2012: 114). This “fundamental mapping” recalls the submapping of the

location branch of the Event Structure Metaphor

STATES ARE LOCATIONS.

King’s Lakoffian influence, we may suggest that he views
DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE
EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION,

Thus, given

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING

as being a special case of

EMOTIONAL

which can then be viewed as a special case

of STATES ARE LOCATIONS, which we know to be a submapping of the location branch of
the Event Structure Metaphor. Though it would be logical to do so, King is not entirely
clear whether or not he would additionally include
THE VERTICAL SCALE

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON

between the lower-level structure BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN
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ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE

and the higher-level structure

EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION.

(17)

EMOTIONAL

Example (17) illustrates this hierarchy:

Level 1: The location Event Structure Metaphor
Submapping: STATES ARE LOCATIONS
Level 2: EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION
(Level X: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE)
Level 3: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE
Additionally, King discusses the spatial and postural

VERTICALITY SCALES

as

distinct structures, discussing unique experiential bases for each scale (cf. e.g., King 2012:
125 for the spatial scale and King 2012: 100, 108 for the postural scale). He also discusses
the more general VERTICAL SCALE as its own distinct structure, a structure that unifies the
two sub-schemas under one heading. He even does this, suggesting that the more general
VERTICALITY SCALE

has an experiential basis that crosscuts the lower structures. He says,

[N]egative experience is partially understood within this corpus as
movement up and down, or position upon, a vertical scale. Perceptual bodily
experiences of being low are certainly used to help understand distressing
experiences. The most highlighted parts of this mapping are that the
experience of distress is being in a place or posture low on the VERTICALITY
scale, and that relief from such a situation is therefore being raised up on
the scale. (King 2012: 139)
Overall, when King refers to spatial and postural

VERTICALITY

as “sub-schemas” (2012:

133), it appears that he has in mind a hierarchy very much like the one presented in Figure
5.3. Nevertheless, the precise relationships obtaining between each of the structures in
Figure 5.3 are not clearly worked out in King’s presentation.
Thus far, we have seen that there is good reason to believe that King sees each of
these mappings presented in Figure 5.3 as structures that are cognitively real and that those
mappings constitute hierarchical structure. As we will see in a later section, there are
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difficulties in reconciling King’s

VERTICALITY

hierarchy with Lakoff’s views.

Nevertheless, it is also clear that King approaches the organization of conceptual structure
in a conscientiously Lakoffian fashion.
Initially, we can note King’s explicit dependence on Lakoff and Johnson. At the
very beginning of his book, he states, “The Cognitive Linguistic framework of George
Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Zoltán Kövecses then provides a basis to investigate the most
significant image schemas (recurring patterns of bodily experience) and primary
metaphors (basic associations between perceptual and other more abstract domains) used
to conceptualize distress” (King 2012: 1-2). Later, King specifies dependence on both
Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999) (see King 2012: 9, footnote 48).
When King discusses the

VERTICALITY

schema with its two sub-schemas, it is

reasonable to assume that, in his mind, this hierarchy coheres with “larger-scale
metaphorical systems” (King 2012: 97) as in Lakoff (1993: 227). Other aspects of King’s
description express a largely Lakoffian framework. We have seen several already. We see
an additional example when he presents analyses of the mappings of each of the subschemas; he presents, as extensively as he could, specifically their (sub)mappings and
entailments (see §§4.3-4). In PMT, however, the notions of submappings and entailments
have slightly more restricted roles. Consequently, the list of mappings would be shorter in
the framework of PMT. Thus, altogether there is ample evidence to see that hierarchical
structure, specifically such as Lakoff and Johnson’s framework would suggest, has a
natural place in King’s description of Hebrew metaphors for distress. More specifically,
there is ample reason to prioritize evaluating King’s

VERTICALITY

hierarchy through the

framework presented in Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999) over frameworks such
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as Grady’s. This is important because, regarding the relationships obtaining between each
of the structures in Figure 5.3, King’s presentation does not give us detailed descriptions.

5.4

Problems with the VERTICALITY hierarchy

5.4.1 Problems when viewed within Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson’s
(1999) framework for hierarchical structure
Assuming that King’s conceptual metaphors based on the

VERTICALITY

image

schema are intended to fit within a Lakoffian framework for hierarchical structure, we can
construct the hierarchy presented in example (18). In relation to example (17) above,
example (18) is less conservative in its assumptions regarding King’s (2012: 99-139)
intended organization of conceptual structure. Regardless of whether or not King had fully
worked out his own view on the issue, the conceptual metaphors that he presents in King
(2012: 99-139) are not accompanied with explanatory comments sufficient enough for the
reader to construct with certainty the relationships (hierarchical or otherwise) that he
envisions obtaining between them. Ultimately, his dependence on Lakoff (1993) and
Lakoff & Johnson (1999) helps complete the picture. Thus, example (18) is a liberal
attempt at fitting King’s (2012: 99-139) VERTICALITY metaphors into a coherent Lakoffian
hierarchy.
(18)

Level 1: The Event Structure Metaphor
Submapping: STATES ARE LOCATIONS
Level 2: EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION
Level 3: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE
Level 4: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE;
BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

Level four has two conceptual metaphors since they branch out from level three.
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Example (18) is really just a small sliver of the “huge, highly structured, fixed
system” (Lakoff 1993: 227) of metaphors that Lakoff has in view. The higher levels shown
in example (18) would branch off in many more directions than what we see represented
here. In a hierarchy such as this, we understand sentence (19) to be motivated by this “huge,
highly structured, fixed” metaphorical system.
(19)

ְהוֶֽה׃
ָּ אתיָך י
ָ֣ ִׁ ִׁממעֲמ ִׁ ּ֖קים קְ ָּר

Psa. 130:1: Out of the depths I cry to you, O LORD!
The depths in sentence (19) is understood as a linguistic expression motivated by the
conceptual metaphor

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL

SCALE which is a special case of BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE

which is a special case of EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION which
is a special case of STATES ARE LOCATIONS which is a submapping of the location branch
of the Event Structure Metaphor. However, such a large amount of structure to account for
the simple metaphorical expression in sentence (19) lacks efficiency, that is, “a great deal
of content is invoked to account for data which might be explained more economically”
(Grady et al. 1996: 179). The simple correspondence BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON
THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE is sufficient to account for the metaphorical expression

in (19) and others like it without any need for recourse to higher levels of structure.
To be clear, higher levels of structure would be useful if they provided accurate
generalizations. However, it is difficult to discern from the hierarchy in (18) what that
generalization is for THE VERTICAL SCALE on Level 3. This is because the independence of
VERTICAL ELEVATION

and UPRIGHTNESS can easily be seen when considering the high end

of their scales (that is, when someone his high or standing respectively). When considering
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the high end of their scales, VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS, on the one hand, map
onto certain target concepts that are not shared between them. For example,

VERTICAL

ELEVATION maps onto STATUS and UPRIGHTNESS does not. And on the other hand, there are

not any target concepts that they do share (at least, none that can be identified with any
certainty). Consequently, these two source concepts seem independent of each other (see
also §5.4.2).
Treating BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE
and

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

as metaphors that are

independent of each other is especially sensible when we consider that they can easily be
understood as primary metaphors25 for which there are independent and direct experiential
bases.
This leads us to another problem regarding the role of embodiment in the
organization of conceptual structure. In the hierarchy above (18), assuming that the
structures in Level 4 have independent and direct experiential bases, the role of the
independent emergence of those structures is unclear. Cognitive linguists have generally
agreed to the hypothesis that meaning in language is ultimately embodied. This is called
the embodiment hypothesis. One central claim of the embodiment hypothesis is that
“[r]eason and conceptual structure are shaped by our bodies, brains, and modes of
functioning in the world. Reason and concepts are therefore not transcendent, that is, not
utterly independent of the body” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 128).

25

Or as a construal of another primary metaphor such as GOOD IS UP and/or HAPPY IS UP (discussed in
§5.5) based on VERTICAL ELEVATION
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For this reason, a full account of any conceptual structure should account for its
motivation in our bodies’ experience. The hierarchical structure for metaphor seen in
example (18) obscures this experiential motivation in the following way: If the lower-level
structures (i.e.,
and

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE)

arise independently and

directly from correlations in experience, then positing the existence of a higher-level
structure (i.e., BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE along with even
higher first and second levels) would obscure the independent experiential motivation of
the lower-level structures,26 suggesting that their structure derives from the higher levels
and that they are fundamentally members of a more complex whole (see Grady et al. 1996:
179-80). If, on the other hand, it is proposed that the higher-level structure arises directly
from correlations in experience and is supposed to partially account for the existence of the
lower-level structures, then it raises the question how this might be reconciled with the
natural assumption that the lower-level structures also arise directly from correlations in
experience. Rather than reconciling the two, it is better to recognize that the higher-level
structure (i.e.,

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE)

is superfluous

both to our ability to account for patterns in metaphorical expressions as well as to our
ability to account for the experiential bases of the relevant (i.e., the lower-level) conceptual
structures. It can, therefore, be discarded.

26

Alternatively, the higher-level structure could be an abstraction from the lower-level structures and
reverse the derivational relationship. While possible, a reversal such as this would give very different
meaning to the notion of inheritance and would probably be represented with a differently shaped
hierarchy. While abstraction is plausible as regards the relationship that Level 3 has with Level 4 in
example (18), its applicability to the entire hierarchy of example (18) would be strained. This is because
it would question the basicness of the Event Structure Metaphor, suggesting that it is a grand abstraction
from hundreds of more basic, low-level conceptual metaphors.
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I do not suggest that all higher-level structures are to be discarded (though some
should be). Rather, I propose that structures lower in the hierarchy of example (18) should
not be viewed as instances of but simply as compatible with the higher-level structures.
The distinction of levels between such mappings should also be discarded. If we follow the
hierarchical structure of example (18) in which lower-level structures are instances (or
special cases) of the higher-level structures, then metaphorical expressions reflecting one
“sub-schema” or the other are ultimately brought under a single heading at some higher
conceptual level (in this case, Level 3). Whether or not they are motivated by the
metaphorical mapping of
UPRIGHTNESS,

VERTICAL ELEVATION

or the metaphorical mapping of

they are represented theoretically as being part of the same conceptual

pattern; their relationship to each other is defined by their mutual inheritance of the higherlevel structure, that is, the structure
SCALE.

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL

I propose instead that metaphorical extensions of

UPRIGHTNESS

VERTICAL ELEVATION

and

are distinct and independent (not instances of higher-level metaphors) but

are nevertheless compatible both with each other and with metaphors such as STATES ARE
LOCATIONS.

Since they are compatible, all of these metaphors may unify to form complex

metaphors. This proposal is made on the belief that the lower-level metaphors
DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE
BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE
LOCATIONS

BEING IN

and BEING IN DISTRESS IS

as well as the higher-level metaphor

STATES ARE

are all primary metaphors and that the independent experiential bases of

primary metaphors correlate with their independent statuses in our minds.
In summary, three significant inadequacies can be observed when we view the
hierarchies of example (18) and Figure 5.3 within Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson’s

66

(1999) framework: First, they are inefficient in their analysis (e.g., see Grady et al. 1996:
179-80); they require a “huge…system” (Lakoff 1993: 227) of entrenched conceptual
structure to account for two very basic correspondences. This inefficiency is further
pronounced when we see how

THE VERTICAL SCALE

in King’s analysis and the

generalization that it implies is undermined by a lack of overlap between
ELEVATION

and

UPRIGHTNESS

VERTICAL

and the target concepts they map onto (see also §5.4.2).

Second, the experiential bases of these lower-level, basic correspondences are plausibly
independent and direct rather than derived from higher-level structures. Thus, the
hierarchies of example (18) and Figure 5.3 obscure the experiential basis for conceptual
structure by suggesting that the lower-level structures are derived from higher levels.
Third, they obscure the nature of the relationships that exist between the metaphorical
expressions that fall under one sub-schema and those that fall under the other; they suggest
that relationships between conceptual metaphors (and thus, between their associated
metaphorical expressions) can be defined by their mutual inheritance of higher-level
structures rather than by reference to the primary metaphors that complex metaphors either
do or do not share (Grady et al. 1996: 185). As I show in §5.5.1, there are more than just
two primary metaphors (one for each source concept) that account for the metaphors
analyzed by King (2012) under the headings of spatial and postural VERTICALITY; instead,
based on PMT, the relationships between metaphorical expressions in King’s corpus can
be defined by reference to six different primary metaphors and which of them they share
(if any).
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5.4.2 Problems when viewed within Grady’s (1997a) framework for hierarchical
structure
Figure 5.3 is re-presented below as Figure 5.4.

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING
DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN
ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL
SCALE

Figure 5.4.

VERTICALITY

hierarchy (second presentation)

There is one way (see Figure 5.5 below) that this hierarchy could be maintained
even within Grady’s framework. While it has legitimate potential, its insufficiency will
become apparent when we discover that it makes unlikely predictions regarding linguistic
and semantic possibilities.
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Primary scene

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE

specification

specification

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING
DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN
ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL
SCALE

Figure 5.5.

The VERTICALITY hierarchy placed within Grady’s framework

In order to fit the VERTICALITY hierarchy into the framework of PMT, it is necessary
to make a difficult assumption. Because primary metaphors are not derived from other
structures but have an independent status, they can only exist at the top of the hierarchy.
Thus, we are forced to assume that the only primary metaphor in the hierarchy is BEING IN
DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE

(see Figure 5.5).

This assumption is neither intuitive nor what King suggests when he points out the
“physiological metonymic motivation” (King 2012: 126)27 of BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING

27

King suggests that the metaphorical mapping of the postural scale onto distress experiences is a primary
metaphor when he says, “Posturally, the basic mapping is BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING LOW ON THE
POSTURAL SCALE. There is potentially a physiological metonymic motivation here, in the involuntary
‘downward’ position of head, face, shoulders, and hands characteristic of sadness, listlessness, or
depression” (King 2012: 126). Kövecses (2002: 173; 2010: 205-06; see also Kövecses 2000: 91,
endnote 1; 2002: 156; 2010: 184; 2020: 34-49) expresses an understanding of the emergence of
correlation metaphors (i.e., primary metaphors) on the basis of “conceptualized physiology (i.e., the
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DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE.

In other words, King assumes that one of the lower-level

metaphors has a direct experiential basis. Assuming the framework of PMT, we should
either not assume that

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

has a

direct experiential basis or we should not maintain the hierarchy. I suggest that we should
not maintain the hierarchy.
It is also necessary to point out that the lower-level structures that specify the
primary metaphor are derived structures; they are products of a process, and logically, there
is less reason for them to be entrenched or for them to be entrenched to the same degree.
This stands in contrast to the Lakoffian approach in which the whole hierarchical structure
is generally treated as an entrenched system in need of discovery and description. He
announces that “a huge system of everyday, conventional, conceptual metaphors has been
discovered…The discovery of this enormous metaphor system has destroyed the traditional
literal-figurative distinction” (Lakoff 1993: 204). He also highlights its description, saying
that, in “the metaphor system of English…hundreds of…mappings have been described to
date” (Lakoff 1993: 227). However, while specified structures in PMT can have a degree
of entrenchment, it is logical to assume that their entrenchment (if at all) should be
categorically weaker than the entrenchment of primary metaphors. Consequently, despite
the fact that the lower-level structures in Figure 5.5 have the feel of entrenched (even
primary) metaphors, maintaining the hierarchy within a PMT framework pushes us to hold
lightly to their existence as distinct, long-term, off-line cognitive objects. This is intuitively

conceptual metonymies)” which King’s “physiological metonymic motivation” apparently echoes.
While I do not mean to suggest that a metonymic view on the emergence of correlation metaphors is
always correct, I do intend to point out King’s more or less explicit identification of BEING IN DISTRESS
IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE as a primary metaphor.
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problematic and is an issue that will ultimately converge with other evidence to
demonstrate the invalidity of the hierarchy in Figure 5.5.
As an aside, for the sake of comprehending the figure, it is necessary to note that,
in Figure 5.5, there is no unification of BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL
SCALE

with other primary metaphors. The only process illustrated is that of specification.

This is why this conceptual structure does not have the normal “shape” of a complex
metaphor as illustrated in Figure 5.2.
Another visually significant way that the structures illustrated in Figure 5.5 differ
from those illustrated in Figure 5.2 is that the primary metaphor in Figure 5.5 is shown
specifying two structures, whereas the complex metaphor in Figure 5.2 is shown specifying
only one structure. Regardless, any entrenchment of the specified structures cannot be
taken for granted. The fact that these two illustrations differ in this regard is
inconsequential.
If we view the hierarchy of Figure 5.4 from a Lakoffian perspective, then lowerlevel structures inherit higher-level structures and add some new structure of their own.
This being the case, two sister nodes28 in a Lakoffian hierarchy each have meaningful
structure not shared with the other node, making them not substitutable for one another.
However, in a hierarchy within the framework of PMT, sister nodes only exist in the case
of structures produced through the process of specification. Specification does not add any
meaningful structure (defined as additional primary metaphors) to the metaphorical
correspondence; instead, it simply picks out in the conceptual world an instantiation of the

28

Sister node is not a term used in the literature. Nevertheless, it seems like a clear and fitting label for the
concept.
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primary or complex metaphor. Thus, the hierarchy in Figure 5.5 illustrates that
DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE

BEING

is simply an instance (with no other

signification) of BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE. In a parallel way, BEING DOWN ON
THE POSTURAL SCALE

signification) of

is also illustrated as being a mere instance (with no other

BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE.

The meaning of both of the

specified structures is simply the meaning of BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE.
Based on the structure in Figure 5.5, a helpful prediction available within the
framework of PMT is that any structures that are specifications of the same primary or
complex metaphor should be substitutable for one another without changing the meaning
in any significant way, that is, they are still able to be construed as reflecting the same
primary or complex metaphor. Note that, while this is a logical prediction within the
formulation of PMT, the suggestion that specifications of the same primary or complex
metaphor may be substituted with other specifications of the same is my own suggestion
and does not come directly from any of Grady’s publications. We can see the
substitutability of specified structure demonstrated in Isa. 1:8:
(20)

ְצּורה׃
ֶֽ ָּ וְ נֹו ְת ָּ ָ֥רה בת־צִׁ יּ֖ ֹון כְ סֻכָּ ָ֣ה בְ כָּ ָ֑רם כִׁ ְמלּונָּ ָ֥ה בְ ִׁמקְ ָּ ּ֖שה כְ ִׁ ָ֥עיר נ

Isa. 1:8: And the daughter of Zion is left like a booth in a vineyard, like a lodge in
a cucumber field, like a besieged city.
In this example, the primary metaphor VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS is successively specified
in three different ways—first, as a booth in a vineyard, then as a lodge in a cucumber field,
and finally as a besieged city. Broadly speaking, the same meaning is conveyed with each
of the successive similes. VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS has been freely specified to A VIABLE
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NATION IS AN UPRIGHT BOOTH IN A VINEYARD,

and so forth for the other similes.29 Though

successive similes do semantically inform one another, let us suppose that Isa. 1:8 only had
one simile: Suppose it said, “And the daughter of Zion is left like a booth in a vineyard,”
and stopped there. Strictly speaking, this individual simile is sufficient to prompt for the
conceptual metaphor

VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS.

The same would be the case if it said,

“And the daughter of Zion is left like a lodge in a cucumber field,” and stopped there. This
example simply demonstrates the phenomenon of free specification and the ease with
which multiple specified structures that arise from the same primary or complex metaphor
are substitutable for each other without changing the broader meaning. Note, though, that
there is no commitment to the entrenchment of specified structures such as

A VIABLE

NATION IS AN UPRIGHT BOOTH IN A VINEYARD.

We have seen that any structures that are specifications of the same primary or
complex metaphor are substitutable for one another without changing the meaning; that is,
regardless of how they are specified, they will still reflect the same primary or complex
metaphor. This has been demonstrated using the set of similes from Isa. 1:8. Thus, in our
case, if the source concepts of

VERTICAL ELEVATION

and

UPRIGHTNESS

(i.e., spatial and

postural VERTICALITY) are in fact merely two specifications of VERTICALITY, then contexts
should allow one to be exchanged for the other without significant semantic effects. In fact,
this should be true regardless of the target concept.

29

These similes communicate the threatened state of the daughter of Zion, that in a metaphorical sense,
she is ready to topple over. ‘Booths’ recall the Israelite wandering in the wilderness and the temporary
booths that they erected while they were traveling. ‘Lodges’ etymologically refer to structures intended
to last only a night; Isa. 24:20 further emphasizes their unsteady nature. ‘A besieged city’ is more
difficult, but may suggest that the city is destined to fall soon.
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A full demonstration of whether or not VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS are
able to be substituted for one another is beyond the scope of this thesis. The following
example demonstrates the kinds of patterns we expect to see in language. Without native
speaker intuition and the ability to generate a variety of authoritatively negative examples,
a substitution test such as what follows may be most useful for the analyst who is making
initial hypotheses. After that, subsequent research would do well to systematically gather
data from the available Classical Hebrew corpus and then look for clear contradictions to
some particular hypothesis or until the supporting examples have reached a point of
saturation. The value of the substitution test is that it plays off of a kind of pattern in
language predicted by PMT’s framework.
Example sentence (21) gives us a context within which we can consider (if
inconclusively) the substitutability of VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS.30
(21)

ל־רּוח לְ החֲיֹות ָ֣רּוח ְשפָּלִׁ֔ ים
֔ ּושפ
ְ כִׁ י כֹ ה אָּ ַ֜מר ָּ ָ֣רם וְ נִׁשֵָּ֗ א שֹ כָ֥ן עד וְ קָּ ָ֣דֹוש ְש ֔מֹו מָּ ָ֥רֹום וְ קָּ ּ֖דֹוש א ְשכָ֑ ֹון וְ את־דכָּא
ּוֶֽ לְ החֲיּ֖ ֹות לָ֥ב נ ְִׁדכ ִׁ ֶָּֽאים׃

Isa. 57:15: For thus says the One who is high and lifted up, who inhabits eternity,
whose name is Holy: “I dwell in the high and holy place, and also with him who is
of a contrite and lowly spirit, to revive the spirit of the lowly, and to revive the heart
of the contrite.”
Sentence (21) clearly reflects VERTICAL ELEVATION and it demonstrates the positive end of
the scale of VERTICAL ELEVATION. Though I do not discuss it here, the “lowly spirit” later
on in the verse reflects the negative end of the scale. The metaphorically used lexical items
are  רוםrwm ‘to be high’ and  נׂשאnśʾ ‘to be lifted up’ in the niphal (see King 2012: 122,
128). For the negative end of the scale, it is possible that BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN

30

Other examples that I have considered informative are Job 14:1, 2 and Isa. 40:8.
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ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE

could be a fitting conceptual description. For the

positive end of the scale in relation to sentence (21),
ELEVATION

SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL

is apt. Regardless of what the most fitting label is for the target concept, what

is clear is that the source concept is
concept in sentence (21) is not

VERTICAL ELEVATION.

UPRIGHTNESS.

It is also clear that the source

The question is whether or not the

metaphorical expression in sentence (21) reflecting

VERTICAL ELEVATION

substituted easily with new metaphorical expressions reflecting

UPRIGHTNESS

can be
without

significant semantic affects.
I now consider the substitutability of source concepts in the metaphorical
expression from sentence (21). The metaphorical expression in sentence (21) refers to God
as  ָּרם וְ נִׁשָּ אrām wəniśśāʾ ‘high and lifted up’. I have already suggested that the primary
metaphor reflected in sentence (21) is
equally be

SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION.

SOCIAL STATUS IS UPRIGHTNESS?

Could it

Intuitively, the following sentences do not

communicate the same thing as God being “high and lifted up,” that is, they communicate
something other than high status.
(22)

31

? כִׁ י כֹ ה אָּ מר נָּכֹון וְ עֹ מד אֲשר ל ֹא נָּפל וְ רגְ לֹו ל ֹא תָּ מּוט

? For thus says the One who is erect and standing, who has not fallen over and
whose foot does not slip…
Observably, this example does not communicate that God has high status, that he is
glorious, etc. Rather, it seems to communicate that he remains viable, existent, functioning,
persisting in his role and in his actions, moral, and so forth. In conclusion, this example

31

This sentence is constructed by the author for the sake of illustration and does not come from any
Classical Hebrew corpus.
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suggests that SOCIAL STATUS IS UPRIGHTNESS is neither a conceptual metaphor nor that it is
a viable substitute for SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION.32
In summary, the

VERTICALITY

hierarchy in Figure 5.4 is not compatible with the

theoretical framework of PMT. Several lines of reasoning converge on this point: First, a
lower-level structure in the hierarchy, specifically

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON

THE POSTURAL SCALE, is identified by King as having a direct experiential basis; or in other

words, it is a primary metaphor. If we agree with this identification, it is not also possible
to maintain the hierarchical structure that we see in Figure 5.5. If instead we do maintain
the hierarchy, we are forced to acknowledge only BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE
VERTICAL SCALE

as having a direct experiential basis. Second, if the lower-level structures

in Figure 5.5 are merely specifications of
VERTICAL SCALE,

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE

then each one should be able to be substituted for the other. While

inconclusive, non-native speaker intuition33 suggests that the meaning is significantly
changed when substituting VERTICAL ELEVATION for UPRIGHTNESS and vice versa.

5.4.3 Conclusion
In the previous subsections, we have seen the inadequacies (or even impossibility)
of the

VERTICALITY

hierarchy as presented in Figure 5.4. Lakoffian hierarchies have

already been shown to be problematic. When viewing the VERTICALITY hierarchy of Figure
5.4 within a Lakoffian framework, first, it is inefficient in its analysis (e.g., see Grady et al.
1996: 179-80) and requires a “huge…system” (Lakoff 1993: 227) of entrenched conceptual

32

33

Being based merely on non-native speaker intuition, this example, though valuable, is distinctly
inconclusive. Another possible, and even likely, explanation would say that this merely demonstrates
selectional differences (see Langacker 1987: 117).
mine and those I asked
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structure to account for two very basic correspondences. Second, it obscures the
experiential basis of conceptual structure. The experiential bases of the lower-level
metaphors in Figure 5.4 are plausibly independent and direct rather than derived from
higher-level structures as suggested by the hierarchy. Third, it obscures the nature of the
relationships that exist between the metaphorical expressions that fall under one subschema and those that fall under the other; they suggest that relationships between
conceptual metaphors (and thus, their associated metaphorical expressions) can be defined
by their mutual inheritance of higher-level structures rather than by reference to the primary
metaphors that complex metaphors either do or do not share (Grady et al. 1996: 185).
When viewing the

VERTICALITY

hierarchy of Figure 5.4 within the framework of

PMT, first, we might come to the conclusion that the lower-level structures are not
grounded directly in bodily experience but derive their experiential motivation from the
higher-level structure; this is unlikely. I suggest instead that we do away with the hierarchy
in favor of the lower-level mappings as primary metaphors. Second, it predicts that the
lower-level structures are semantically similar such that they each prompt the hearer to
recruit the same primary metaphor. Consequently, one should be able to substitute for the
other without significant semantic effects. On the basis of intuition, on the hand, and the
theory of primary metaphors on the other, this does not appear to hold. I conclude that a
VERTICALITY
ELEVATION

hierarchy in which

VERTICALITY

has two sub-schemas—VERTICAL

and UPRIGHTNESS—is simply not valid as it stands and needs reanalysis.
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5.5

A refined analysis
In §5.4.1, I presented example (18) which attempts to fit King’s (2012: 99-139)

VERTICALITY

metaphors into a coherent Lakoffian hierarchy. Example (18) is repeated

below as example (23).
(23)

Level 1: The Event Structure Metaphor
Submapping: states are locations
Level 2: EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION
Level 3: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE
Level 4: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE;
BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

Figures 5.3-4 illustrate the third and fourth levels from example (23). That figure is
presented again below as Figure 5.6.

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING
DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN
ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL
SCALE

Figure 5.6.

VERTICALITY

hierarchy (third presentation)

Having already shown the inadequacies of this hierarchical structure, I propose instead (1)
that we maintain the two lower-level structures as distinct cognitive objects and that we
discard the higher-level structure BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE.
In other words, the two “sub-schemas” VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS are no longer
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considered sub-schemas, but are considered their own independent image schemas.
Consequently, primary metaphors such as GOOD IS UP and VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS are no
longer viewed as being formally related to one another. Theoretically, any metaphorical
expressions motivated by one have no necessary relation to metaphorical expressions
motivated by the other. Furthermore, I propose (2) that we can view these metaphors, not as
sub-metaphors, but as independent structures that arise directly from correlations in
experience. That is, I propose that we categorize them as primary metaphors, or as variations
on primary metaphors such as those presented below in §5.5.1.

5.5.1 Relevant primary metaphors with the source concepts VERTICAL ELEVATION
or UPRIGHTNESS
I have proposed that a distinction be made between metaphors with the source
concept

VERTICAL ELEVATION

and those with the source concept

UPRIGHTNESS.

distinction, however, does not simply result in two primary metaphors (e.g.,
and

VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS).

Rather,

VERTICAL ELEVATION

This

GOOD IS UP

in particular is a source

concept that participates in several primary scenes. King cites from his corpus 81 instances
of

VERTICALITY

metaphors. The primary metaphors relevant for a reanalysis of those

metaphorical expressions are given below along with their experiential motivations:
(24)

Metaphor: FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS ERECTNESS
Motivation: The correlation between erect position and state of functionality, for
objects and people.
(Grady 1997a: 282)

(25)

GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN

…
Physical basis for personal well-being: Happiness, health, life, and control—the
things that principally characterize what is good for a person—are all UP.
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 16)

79

(26)

Metaphor: BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE
Motivation: The correlation between being in a higher physical position and having
greater control over objects, people, situations.
(Grady 1997a: 290)

(27)

Metaphor: SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION
Motivation: (Corollary of BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE)
And/or the tendency to defer to taller, bigger people.
(Grady 1997a: 294)

(28)

Metaphor: ACCESSIBLE TO PERCEPTION/AWARENESS IS “UP”
Motivation: The correlation between being in a higher position—e.g., at eye level,
or out from under an obstruction—and being perceptible.
(Grady 1997a: 297)

(29)

Metaphor: “HAPPY IS UP” (See Lakoff & Johnson 1980)
Motivation: The correlation between happiness and erect body posture.
And/or correlation between being in a higher position (e.g., on a hill) and feeling
safe, in control, etc.
(Grady 1997a: 295)
The metaphor

GOOD IS UP

above requires some explanation. Grady (1997a) does

not include it in his list of primary metaphors. I have included it here both for its necessity
in accounting for the data and for its plausibility as a primary metaphor. The experiential
basis given by Lakoff and Johnson and listed above is that “[h]appiness, health, life, and
control—the things that principally characterize what is good for a person—are all

UP”

(1980: 16). When they say that those things that are good for a person are all UP, I interpret
this to mean that they are UP in a metaphorical sense. Future research may clarify what kind
of scene in particular might motivate GOOD IS UP as a primary metaphor. For now, we may
note that the concepts GOOD and BAD are basic concepts. Grady points this out:
The fact that there is, for instance, a neural mechanism (or somatic marker,
in Damasio’s (1994) terminology) which associates unpleasant “gut”
sensations with certain types of stimulus, and another which associates
pleasant sensations with other stimulus, suggests that the target concepts
80

GOOD and BAD may have some physiological basis. They may refer in some

sense to very specific types of sensations, rather than merely being vague
terms whose meanings vary freely from person to person and according to
the domains in which they are applied. (Grady 1997a: 161; see also Damasio
1994: 159, 164)
The particular scene that would correlate UP with GOOD and DOWN with BAD has yet to be
satisfactorily identified. It may even arise from a scene in which our bodies are either
upright or prone (see Grady 1997a: 114), but in such a way that our attention is drawn
specifically to the height of our bodies or to our vantage point rather than to postural
uprightness itself.
The metaphor HAPPY IS UP also deserves some explanation. While the primary scene
correlates erect body posture with happiness, the source concept is categorized as VERTICAL
ELEVATION

and not as

UPRIGHTNESS.

This is clear from the term

UP

which has been

consistently used in the sense VERTICAL ELEVATION. Additionally, Grady points to another
correlation—that of “being in a higher position (e.g., on a hill) and feeling safe, in control,
etc.” (1997a: 295). The idea then is that, while an instance of this primary scene may
involve erect body posture, attention is given to height rather than posture. Thus, VERTICAL
ELEVATION is abstracted from a variety of scenes some of which involve posture and others

of which do not. This accounts for metaphorical expressions in English such as “She is in
high spirits” (Grady 1997a: 219) which do not reflect any focus on posture.

5.5.2 An analysis organized around primary metaphors
Grady et al. (1996: 185) proposed that “[a]ll metaphors either are, or are composed
of, primitives [(i.e., primary metaphors)].” My proposal above that
and

UPRIGHTNESS

VERTICAL ELEVATION

should be viewed as two distinct source concepts flows directly from

this proposal. The composition (or unification) of primary metaphors along with their
81

specification results in a number of possible arrays of conceptual structure. King had
analyzed 81 metaphorical expressions from his corpus as reflecting the VERTICALITY image
schema and its metaphorical mapping onto experiences of distress. In chapter six, I will
reanalyze those metaphorical expressions and show how they may be analyzed within
PMT.
While King’s analysis, on the one hand, treats spatial and postural VERTICALITY as
two sub-schemas, and my analysis, on the other hand, treats them as fully independent
concepts, there are nevertheless two ways in PMT that
UPRIGHTNESS

VERTICAL ELEVATION

can still overlap in the same metaphorical expression. The first way is

through unification, the second is through specification. First, if we consider
ELEVATION

and

VERTICAL

and UPRIGHTNESS to be two separate source concepts that are also compatible

with each other, then metaphors such as BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE and VIABILITY
IS UPRIGHTNESS

can unify to form a complex metaphor (e.g., Psa. 3:1[2]). Thus, through

unification VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS can both feature as distinct meaningful
aspects of the same metaphorical expression.
Second, these two concepts can also overlap through the process of specification.
Because an upright entity is higher than an entity that is prone,

VERTICAL ELEVATION

is

able to specify to an upright entity. However, in cases of specification, the fact that the
entity is upright is incidental to the specified concept.
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Placing primary metaphors based on King’s two “sub-schemas” into the framework
of PMT yields the following representative possibilities. Each of the structures below is
supposed to motivate metaphorical expressions directly.34

Primary scene

SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION

Figure 5.7.

The primary metaphor SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION

Primary scene

VIABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY IS UPRIGHTNESS

Figure 5.8.

34

The primary metaphor VIABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY IS UPRIGHTNESS

For simplicity’s sake, I only show the relationships that can exist between SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL
ELEVATION and FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS. Nevertheless, all of the primary metaphors
mentioned in §5.5.1 are compatible with each other.
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Primary scene

SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION

specification

A PERSON WITH HIGH SOCIAL STATUS IS AN UPRIGHT PERSON

Figure 5.9.

The primary metaphor SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION specified
to A PERSON WITH HIGH SOCIAL STATUS IS AN UPRIGHT PERSON

35

35

The organization of structure in Figure 5.9 can remain the same while having different values.
Technically, I could have added another figure to cover the same organization of conceptual structure
but using VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS as the primary metaphor instead. That is, I could have had a figure
that displayed VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS specified to something such as AN UPRIGHT PERSON or A
TOWER, and so forth. Similarly, the structure that is displayed in Figure 5.9 could be shown with any
number of specified structures such as A PERSON IN THE GRAVE or AN ENTITY IN THE SKY. The structure
displayed in Figure 5.9 was intentionally chosen to illustrate the particularly confusing case in which
VERTICAL ELEVATION specifies to AN UPRIGHT PERSON.
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Primary scene

Primary scene

VIABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY IS
UPRIGHTNESS

SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL
ELEVATION

unification

unification

A VIABLE, HIGH-STATUS ENTITY IS
A TALL, UPRIGHT ENTITY

Figure 5.10.

The complex metaphor A VIABLE, HIGH-STATUS ENTITY IS A TALL,
UPRIGHT ENTITY
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Primary scene

Primary scene

VIABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY IS
UPRIGHTNESS

SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL
ELEVATION

unification

unification

A VIABLE, HIGH-STATUS ENTITY IS
A TALL, UPRIGHT ENTITY

specification

A NATION THAT USED TO HAVE
HIGH STATUS BUT NOW IS BOTH
DESTROYED AND OF LOW STATUS
IS A TALL CITY WALL THAT HAS
FALLEN DOWN OR BEEN RAZED

Figure 5.11. The complex metaphor A VIABLE, HIGH-STATUS ENTITY IS A TALL, UPRIGHT
ENTITY specified to A NATION THAT USED TO HAVE HIGH STATUS BUT NOW IS BOTH
DESTROYED AND OF LOW STATUS IS A TALL CITY WALL THAT HAS FALLEN DOWN OR BEEN
RAZED

If, on the one hand, we are clear about which primary metaphors may be involved in
giving rise to particular metaphorical expressions and, on the other hand, we understand the
processes of unification and specification, then the possible arrays of conceptual structure
such as those in Figures 5.7-5.11 should be easily accessible when describing both individual
metaphorical expressions as well as whole patterns. In the next chapter, I reanalyze the
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Classical Hebrew expressions in King’s corpus that he had originally analyzed as mapping
VERTICALITY onto EXPERIENCES OF DISTRESS (King 2012: 99-139, 367-82).
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CHAPTER 6
REFINING THE ANALYSIS, II: APPLICATION

6.1

Introduction
In this thesis, I propose that the metaphors on the lower level of King’s

VERTICALITY

hierarchy (see Figures 5.3-4, 5.6) be treated as independent metaphors and

that the higher level be discarded. This proposal is based on the framework of PMT and
especially the central role that it gives to certain locally-defined experience-types called
primary metaphors in structuring metaphorical thought and language. King’s lower-level
metaphors

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE

and

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE can be reinterpreted as negative

construals of primary metaphors such as HAPPY IS UP and VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS among
others (see §5.5.1). Based on the processes of unification and specification, Figures 5.7-11
presents a variety of arrays of conceptual structure that illustrates the kinds of conceptual
organization that should account for the metaphorical expressions in King’s corpus.
The focus of this chapter is to show how PMT applies to Hebrew data by
reanalyzing the particular metaphorical expressions from King’s corpus that reflect the
VERTICALITY

image schema (King 2012: 99-139, 367-82). It is important to keep in mind

that this task takes the onomasiological route to analysis; that is, the analysis fixes the
conceptual/primary metaphors and then looks for potential linguistic expressions that are
compatible with those categories.36 Chapter five has established the relevant

36

The semasiological route in which the analysis fixes the language data and then explores which
conceptual structures may be related to it would complement King’s work as well as my own.

88

conceptual/primary metaphors, and this chapter looks for metaphorical expressions in
King’s data that may reflect those metaphors. As a consequence of the onomasiological
route, it is understood that any particular metaphorical expression may reflect more
conceptual structure than what I have identified, but not less.
My reanalysis is presented first in §6.2 where I provide a table that suggests, for
each metaphorical expression, which primary metaphor (or primary metaphors) accounts
for its conceptual motivation. Second, in §6.3, I discuss in greater detail the analysis of
seven specific examples. I discuss the experiential grounding of the metaphors, along with
whether and in what ways they have been specified, as well as any additional details that
King highlights in his discussions. Finally, for each example, I illustrate the array of
conceptual structure that is supposed to (partially) account for it.

6.2

King’s VERTICALITY metaphors reanalyzed
Table 6.1 below suggests which primary metaphor (or primary metaphors)

motivates the metaphorical expressions previously analyzed as VERTICALITY metaphors in
King’s corpus (see especially King 2012: 367-82). The analyses provided in Table 6.1
represent how an idealized hearer might interpret the metaphorical expressions; it does not
claim to represent how every hearer will interpret the metaphors. As Fauconnier and Turner
point out, “[L]anguage does not represent meaning directly; instead, it systematically
prompts the construction of meaning” (2002: 142; cf. Langacker 1987: 66-67). Thus,
linguistic expressions may have multiple “correct” interpretations. An important benefit of
linking metaphorical expressions with the primary metaphors that may have motivated
them is that we gain an understanding of the kinds of constraints on the hearer’s process of
interpretation.
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Reanalysis of metaphorical expressions from King’s corpus

Table 6.1.

ACCESSIBLE

FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS

GOOD IS UP

UPRIGHTNESS

Job 3:22

BEING IN

SOCIAL

TO PERCEP-

CONTROL IS

STATUS IS

TION/

BEING

VERTICAL

ABOVE

ELEVATION

IS UP

X

Job 7:8-10

X

Job 12:22

X

Job 14:11-12

X

Job 14:13

X

Job 16:15

X

Job 17:1

X

Job 17:13-14

X

Job 17:15-16

X

Job 21:26

X

X

Job 30:19

X

X

Psa. 3:1[2]

X

X

Psa. 7:5[6]

X

X

Psa. 9:13[14]
Psa. 17:11

X
X

Psa.
18:16[17]

X

Psa.
22:15[16]

X

Psa. 28:1

X

Psa. 30:1[2]

X

Psa. 30:3[4]

X

Psa. 30:9[10]

X

Psa. 35:7-8

X

X

Psa. 38:6[7]

Psa. 40:2[3]

X

X

Psa. 18:5[6]

Psa. 38:1617[17-18]

HAPPY IS UP

AWARENESS

X
X
X

X
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ACCESSIBLE

FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS

GOOD IS UP

UPRIGHTNESS

Psa. 41:8[9]

BEING IN

SOCIAL

TO PERCEP-

CONTROL IS

STATUS IS

TION/

BEING

VERTICAL

ABOVE

ELEVATION

HAPPY IS UP

AWARENESS
IS UP

X

Psa. 42:5[6]

X

Psa. 42:6[7]

X

Psa. 42:7[8]

X

Psa. 44:25[26]

X

Psa. 56:13[14]

X

X
X

Psa. 57:6[7]

X

Psa. 62:4[5]

X

Psa. 69:12[2-3]

X

X

Psa. 69:1415[15-16]

X

X

Psa. 71:20

X

Psa. 86:13

X

Psa. 88:3[4]

X

Psa. 88:4[5]

X

Psa. 88:5[6]

X

X

X

X

Psa. 88:6[7]

X

Psa. 116:3

X

Psa. 116:6

X

Psa. 119:25
Psa. 119:28

X
X

X

Psa. 119:85

X

Psa. 130:1

X

Psa. 140:911[10-12]

X

Psa. 142:6[7]
Psa. 143:3

X

X
X

X
X

Psa. 143:7

X

Psa. 144:7

X

Isa. 38:10

X

X
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ACCESSIBLE

FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS

GOOD IS UP

UPRIGHTNESS

BEING IN

SOCIAL

TO PERCEP-

CONTROL IS

STATUS IS

TION/

BEING

VERTICAL

ABOVE

ELEVATION

HAPPY IS UP

AWARENESS
IS UP

Isa. 38:14

X

Isa. 38:17-18

X

Jer. 18:20

X

Jer. 18:22

X

Lam. 1:13

X

Lam. 3:16

X

Lam. 3:20

X

Lam. 3:28
Lam. 3:29

X

Lam. 3:55

X

X

Jonah 2:2[3]

X

X

Jonah 2:3[4]

X

X

Jonah 2:5[6]

X

X

Jonah 2:6[7]

X

1QH 10:20-21

X

1QH 10:27-28
1QH 11:6

X

1QH 11:7-18

X

1QH 11:19-20

X

1QH 13:36-39

X

1QH 14:22-24

X

1QH 15:2-3
1QH 16:28-29

X

1QH 17:3-4
1QH 17:8-9

X

X

1QH 18:33-34

X

11Q6 (Plea for
Deliverance)
19:9-11
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X

6.3

Several examples discussed in greater detail
The following examples will be discussed with respect, first, to their experiential

motivations, second, to any ways that they specify primary or complex metaphors, and
third, to any additional information gathered from King’s observations. Included in the
analysis of each example will be a figure illustrating the underlying conceptual structure.

6.3.1 Psalm 71:20
(30)

37

ֲשר הִׁ ְר ִׁאית ִׁני׀ צָּ ָ֥רֹות רבֵ֗ ֹות וְ ָּ ָ֫רעָ֥ ֹות ּתָּ ָ֥שּוב ְּתחיָ֑י ִׁני ּוֶֽ ִׁמ ְּתהֹ ָ֥מֹות הַָּ֝ ֵ֗ ָּארץ ּתָּ ָ֥שּוב ּתע ֲֶֽל ִׁני׃
ֶׁ֤ א

Psa. 71:20: You who have made me see many troubles and calamities will revive
me again; from the depths of the earth you will bring me up again.
The italicized metaphor in Psa. 71:20 reflects the primary metaphor
schematic concepts in the metaphor

GOOD IS UP

BEING IN THE DEPTHS OF THE EARTH.

are specified to

GOOD IS UP.

BEING IN A BAD STATE IS

King (2012: 116-17) points out that  ְּתהֹוםtəhôm

‘depths’ in this verse does not refer to water as it usually does.

37

The

Qere readings are represented in this thesis without reference to their Kethiv counterparts.
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Primary scene

GOOD IS UP

specification

BEING IN A BAD STATE IS BEING IN THE DEPTHS OF THE EARTH

Figure 6.1.

Conceptual structure motivating the metaphor from Psa. 71:20

6.3.2 Psalm 56:13[14]
(31)

ֱֹלהים בְַ֝ ֵ֗אֹור ֶֽהח ִׁ ֶֽיים׃
ָ֑ ִׁ ִׁ ֶׁ֤כי הִׁ צַּ֪לְ ּתָּ נפְ ִׁ֡ ִׁשי ִׁממָּ ות ֲה ָ֥ל ֹא רגְ ֵ֗לי ִָׁ֫מ ָ֥דחִׁ י ַ֭ ְל ִׁ ֶֽה ְתהלְך לִׁ פְ נָ֣י א

Psa. 56:13[14]: For you have delivered my soul from death, yes, my feet from
falling, that I may walk before God in the light of life.
The

italicized

metaphor

in

Psa.

56:13[14]

FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS.

reflects

the

primary

metaphor

The schematic concepts in the metaphor

FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS specify to BEING FUNCTIONAL IS BEING UPRIGHT
AND ABLE TO WALK.

However, it may be the case that another primary metaphor such as

GOOD IS BRIGHT/BAD IS DARK

unifies with it, which would make it a complex metaphor.
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Primary scene

FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS

specification

BEING FUNCTIONAL IS BEING UPRIGHT AND ABLE TO WALK

Figure 6.2.

Conceptual structure motivating the metaphor from Psa. 56:13[14]

6.3.3 Psalm 44:25[26]
(32)

ִׁ ֶׁ֤כי ָּ ָ֣שחָּ ה לעָּפָּ ָ֣ר נפְ ָ֑שנּו דָּ בְ ָּ ּ֖קה ל ָּ ָָּ֣ארץ בִׁ טְ נֶֽנּו׃

Psa. 44:25[26]: For our soul is bowed down to the dust; our belly clings to the
ground.
Psa. 44:25[26] is set within the context of military defeat and the question of why God has
hidden his face from his people. The italicized metaphor in sentence (32) reflects the
primary metaphors

FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS

and

BEING IN CONTROL IS

BEING ABOVE.

The term  נפשnepeš translated here as ‘soul’ can also be translated anatomically as
‘neck’ or ‘throat’. Thus, “For our neck is bowed to the dust, our belly clings to the ground”
(Alter 2019: 2976-977). Translated this way and put in contrast with the imperative of the
next verse “Rise up; come to our help!” (Psa. 44:26[27]), the psalmist’s incapability to help
because of his posture, with his neck in the dust and his belly on the ground, is put in
contrast to God’s ability to help if only he would rise up. Here we see not only the concept
of being ready to act when upright but also the ability to act in an upright position. Thus,
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I have suggested that the metaphorical expressions in sentence (32) are partially motivated
by the primary metaphor FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS.
Furthermore, if we see defeat rather than sorrow or emotional distress in the posture
of the psalmist in Psa. 44:25[26], then the psalmist, representing the whole nation,38
describes himself in the position of a forced defeat, perhaps implying someone standing
over him and putting his neck in the dust. The psalmist is the controlled and his enemy is
his controller. Thus, I have suggested that the metaphorical expressions in sentence (32)
are partially motivated by the primary metaphor BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE.
After unifying, these primary metaphors yield the complex metaphor
CONTROL AND ABLE TO ACT IS BEING UPRIGHT AND ABOVE ANOTHER ENTITY.

it is construed negatively and specifies to

BEING IN

In this verse,

BEING DEFEATED AND INCAPABLE OF HELPING

ONESELF IS HAVING ONE’S NECK IN THE DUST AND ONE’S BELLY STUCK TO THE GROUND.

With regards to Psa. 44:25[26], King points out that, in comparison with having a
bowed head, “the verb [ דבקdbq ‘to stick’] evokes a much lower posture, ‘stuck’ to the
ground” (2012: 128). He suggests that verses such as this one “demonstrate lower physical
posture entailing greater distress” (2012: 129).

38

MEMBER OF A CATEGORY FOR THE CATEGORY

part-for-whole metonymy (see Kövecses 2010: 181)
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Primary scene

Primary scene

FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS

BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE

unification

unification

BEING IN CONTROL AND ABLE
TO ACT IS BEING UPRIGHT AND
ABOVE ANOTHER ENTITY

specification

BEING DEFEATED AND INCAPABLE
OF HELPING ONESELF IS HAVING
ONE’S NECK IN THE DUST AND ONE’S
BELLY STUCK TO THE GROUND

Figure 6.3.

Conceptual structure motivating the metaphor from Psa. 44:25[26]

6.3.4 Job 7:8-10
(33)

ירנּו
ּ֖ ִׁיתֹו וְ ל ֹא־יכ
ָ֑ ינ ִׁני׃ כָּלָּ ָ֣ה ַָּ֭ענָּן וילְָ֑ך כָ֥ן יֹו ָ֥רד ַ֝ ְש ֵ֗אֹול ָ֣ל ֹא יע ֲֶֽלה׃ ל ֹא־י ָָּ֣שּוב עָ֣ ֹוד לְ ב
ֶֽ א־תשּורנִׁי עָ֣ין ָ֑רֹ ִׁאי עינּ֖יָך ִׁ ָ֣בי וְ א
ְ ַ֭ ֹ ֶֽל
עָ֣ ֹוד ְמקֹ ֶֽמֹו׃

Job 7:8-10: The eye of him who sees me will behold me no more; while your eyes
are on me, I shall be gone. As the cloud fades and vanishes, so he who goes down
to Sheol does not come up; he returns no more to his house, nor does his place know
him anymore.
The italicized metaphor in Job 7:8-10 reflects in this context the primary metaphor
ACCESSIBLE TO PERCEPTION/AWARENESS IS UP.
ACCESSIBLE TO PERCEPTION/AWARENESS IS UP
SHEOL.
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The schematic concepts in the metaphor

specify to BEING IMPERCEPTIBLE IS BEING IN

Primary scene

ACCESSIBLE TO PERCEPTION/AWARENESS IS UP

specification

BEING IMPERCEPTIBLE IS BEING IN SHEOL

Figure 6.4.

Conceptual structure motivating the metaphor from Job 7:8-10

6.3.5 Psalm 40:2[3]
(34)

ויע ֲֶׁ֤ל ִׁני׀ ִׁמ ָ֥בֹור שָּ אֹון ִׁמ ִׁ ַּ֪טיט ה ָָּ֫י ָ֥וֵ֥ן ויָּ ֵּ֖֥קם על־סָ֥לע רגְ ֵ֗לי כֹו ָ֥נֵ֥ן אֲשֻ ָּ ֶֽרי׃

Psalm 40:2[3]: He drew me up from the pit of destruction, out of the miry bog, and
set my feet upon a rock, making my steps secure.
The metaphorical expressions in Psa. 40:2[3] may reflect the primary metaphors HAPPY IS
UP

and

GOOD IS UP.

In this verse, David refers to God bringing him up from a lowly,

negative place to a high, good place.

HAPPY IS UP

seems especially likely given the

following verse which begins, “He put a new song in my mouth, a song of praise to our
God” (Psa. 40:3[4]), reflecting David’s good emotion.

GOOD IS UP

reflects a focus on

David’s situation more than just on his emotion. David was in a bad situation; he was
metaphorically down in a pit of destruction and in a miry bog. God caused his situation to
change from a bad one to a good one; he brought him up and set his feet upon a rock.
Though not included in this analysis, there is also a possibility that UPRIGHTNESS is in view
in this passage. The Hebrew terms  קוםqwm ‘to cause to stand’ (Clines 1993-2011: Vol. 7,

98

234) and  כוןkwn ‘to establish’ (Clines 1993-2011: Vol. 4, 373) have been collocated in
other parts of the Hebrew Bible to refer to making entities upright (cf. 2 Sam. 7:12-13).
After unifying, these primary metaphors yield the complex metaphor
GOOD SITUATION WITH GOOD EMOTIONS IS BEING IN A HIGH LOCATION.

BEING IN A

This specifies to

BEING IN A GOOD SITUATION WITH GOOD EMOTIONS IS BEING SET HIGH ON A ROCK. Construed

negatively, it specifies to

BEING IN A SITUATION OF DESTRUCTION WITH BAD EMOTIONS IS

BEING IN A PIT AND A MIRY BOG.

Another primary metaphor that may unify with

HAPPY IS UP

and

GOOD IS UP

in

motivating the metaphorical expressions in sentence (34) is CONSTRAINTS ON ACTIONS ARE
PHYSICAL BOUNDARIES.

This would suggest that additional meaning is intended in the

phrase  בֹור שָּ אֹוןbôr šāʾôn ‘pit of destruction’.
Additionally, King points out the entailment that, “if distress is being low, relief
becomes movement upwards” (2012: 122). He suggests that Psa. 40:2[3] demonstrates this
entailment with its use of  עלהʿlh ‘to cause to go up’ in the hiphil (2012: 122).
Finally, King (2012: 134) suggests that the phrases  בֹור שָּ אֹוןbôr šāʾôn ‘pit of
destruction’ and  טִׁ יט היָּוןṭîṭ hayyāwēn ‘miry bog’ are more novel reflections of the
VERTICALITY

image schema mapped onto situations of physical and emotional distress.

This is especially in contrast to a conventional phrase such as יֹורדי בֹור
ְ yôrədê bôr ‘those
who go down to the pit’. Thus, in the PMT framework, I suggest that  בֹור שָּ אֹוןbôr šāʾôn ‘pit
of destruction’ and  טִׁ יט היָּוןṭîṭ hayyāwēn ‘miry bog’ may be viewed as more novel reflections
of GOOD IS UP than יֹורדי בֹור
ְ yôrədê bôr ‘those who go down to the pit’.
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Primary scene

Primary scene

HAPPY IS UP

GOOD IS UP

unification

unification

BEING IN A GOOD SITUATION
WITH GOOD EMOTIONS IS BEING
IN A HIGH LOCATION

specification

BEING IN A GOOD SITUATION WITH
GOOD EMOTIONS IS BEING SET HIGH
ON A ROCK; BEING IN A SITUATION OF
DESTRUCTION WITH BAD EMOTIONS
IS BEING IN A PIT AND MIRY BOG

Figure 6.5.

Conceptual structure motivating the metaphor from Psa. 40:2[3]

6.3.6 Psalm 62:4[5]
(35)

לּו־סלָּה׃
ֶֽ ְֶׁ֤אְך ִׁמ ְשאתֹו ׀ ָּיע ֲָ֣צּו לְ ה ִׁדיח י ְִׁר ַּ֪צּו ָ֫ ָּכזָּ ָ֥ב בְ ִׁ ָ֥פיו יְבָּ ָ֑רכּו ּוַ֝ בְ קִׁ ְר ֵ֗ ָּבם ְיקל

Psalm 62:4[5]: They only plan to thrust him down from his high position. They take
pleasure in falsehood. They bless with their mouths, but inwardly they curse. Selah
The italicized metaphor in Psa. 62:4[5] may reflect HAPPY IS UP. If this is the case, then the
high position signifies David’s good emotion, perhaps because all is well so long as he
metaphorically remains in his high position. This then specifies to

A PERSON FORCED BY

OTHERS TO HAVE NEGATIVE EMOTIONS IS A PERSON WHO IS FORCED DOWN FROM A HIGH
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POSITION. While this is the current analysis, there is another possible way of looking at this

metaphor.
It

is

possible

that

Psa.

62:4[5]

FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS

and

reflects

the

primary

metaphors

SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION.

After unifying, these primary metaphors would yield the complex metaphor
HIGH-STATUS PERSON IS AN UPRIGHT, HIGH PERSON.

A VIABLE,

This complex metaphor then specifies

a context in which another person causes the viable, high-status person to become defeated
and humbled.
Based on Psa. 62:4[5] alone, this metaphor would not clearly evoke the primary
metaphor FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS. However, within the context of the
preceding verse which speaks of attacking and battering a man who is “like a leaning wall,
a tottering fence” (Psa. 62:3[4]), v. 4[5] does seem to assume that both primary metaphors
are active together. This seems especially likely in light of the similar sounds in the verb
 הַ ְׁדחּויָהhaddəḥûyâ ‘tottering’ in the phrase “tottering fence” and ַ לְׁ הַ ִדיחləhaddîaḥ ‘to thrust

down’. This is sufficient motivation for Alter (2019: 3032) to translate the first verb as
‘shaky’ and the second as ‘to shake’.
The following figure follows the first analysis using HAPPY IS UP.
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Primary scene

HAPPY IS UP

unification

A PERSON FORCED BY
OTHERS TO HAVE NEGATIVE
EMOTIONS IS A PERSON WHO
IS FORCED DOWN FROM A
HIGH POSITION

Figure 6.6.

Conceptual structure motivating the metaphor from Psa. 62:4[5]

6.3.7 Psalm 119:28
(36)

דָּ לְ פָּ ָ֣ה ַ֭נפְ ִׁשי ִׁמּתּוגָּ ָ֑ה ַ֝קי ְֵ֗מ ִׁני כִׁ ְדבָּ ֶֽרָך׃

Psa. 119:28: I have collapsed with intense sorrow: make me stand upright, as your
word promises. (Allen 2002: 170)
The

italicized

metaphors

in

Psa.

119:28

FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS

metaphors yield the complex metaphor
PERSON.

reflects

the

primary

metaphors

and HAPPY IS UP. After unifying, these primary

A VIABLE, HAPPY PERSON IS A FULLY UPRIGHT

This complex metaphor is not clearly specified any further. King comments,

“Restoration to an erect posture then describes rescue from distress, or the ability to
withstand it” (2012: 130). Psa. 119:28 illustrates both the entrance into a state of distress
( דלףdlp ‘to collapse’) and the plea for restoration ( קוםqwm ‘to set upright’ (used
metaphorically) in the piel).
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Primary scene

Primary scene

FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS

unification

HAPPY IS UP

unification

A VIABLE, HAPPY PERSON IS A
FULLY UPRIGHT PERSON

Figure 6.7.

Conceptual structure motivating the metaphor from Psa. 119:28
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

7.1

Summary of the argument
King (2012: 99-139) analyzed a pattern of metaphorical expressions in Classical

Hebrew that maps the image schema VERTICALITY onto BEING IN DISTRESS. In his analysis,
he treats VERTICALITY as having two sub-schemas—spatial and postural VERTICALITY. This
results in a hierarchy such as the one presented in Figure 7.1. I argued, on theoretical
grounds, that the higher-level metaphor should be discarded and the two lower-level
metaphors be maintained.

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN
ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL
SCALE

Figure 7.1.

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING
DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

VERTICALITY

hierarchy (fourth presentation)

The theoretical basis for this adjustment to King’s organization of conceptual
structure follows the framework of PMT and can be summarized as follows. King (being
influenced by Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999)) organizes metaphorical
conceptual structure in such a way that it does not give primary metaphors their logical
role. Primary metaphors arise independently from local experience-types called primary
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scenes. These experience-types are goal-oriented correlations in experience between
physical and mental aspects of a momentary scene. In King’s analysis, primary metaphors
are not treated as independent structures; instead, they are treated as dependent structures
within larger hierarchies. In my analysis, I considered the lower-level structures in Figure
7.1 to be primary metaphors. If primary metaphors are given their proper role as
independent structures, then the conceptual metaphors
ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE

BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN

(reflecting the source concept

ELEVATION) and BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

VERTICAL

(reflecting the

source concept UPRIGHTNESS) will be viewed as independent structures, not as instances of
BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE
VERTICALITY)

(reflecting the source concept

as King suggests.

I highlighted two processes that could apply to metaphorical conceptual structure.
The first is unification in which multiple primary metaphors unify to form a complex
metaphor on the conceptual level. The second is specification in which the source and/or
target concept of a primary or complex metaphor specifies, or picks out, a conceptual
instantiation of it. Thus, the schematic concept

UPRIGHT ENTITY

could specify

A PILLAR.

Importantly, specification does not (without further processes) invoke additional primary
metaphors.
Within the framework of PMT, primary metaphors treated as independent entities
along with the processes of unification and specification can equally account for the
metaphorical expressions in King’s corpus that he had based on the

VERTICALITY

image

schema (King 2012: 99-139, 367-82). Yet an analysis within the framework of PMT better
accounts for the role that experiential correlations have in motivating metaphors.
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7.2

Significance

7.2.1 A more accurate description
Though there are numerous aspects of metaphor that are not fully accounted for in
PMT, the analysis that I have offered here takes into account the role that locally-defined
experience-types have in influencing conceptual structure. For this reason, assuming the
legitimacy of PMT, this thesis has genuinely refined the earlier analysis of metaphors
describing experiences of distress in Classical Hebrew.
Having dissolved the previously assumed connection between
ELEVATION

and

UPRIGHTNESS,

VERTICAL

a result of my analysis is that metaphorical expressions

previously analyzed as related to each other on the basis of shared inheritance of higherlevel structure are now treated as fully independent conceptual patterns. In my thesis and
in PMT generally, “[b]oth commonalities and differences among metaphors can be
accounted for specifically by reference to the primitives [(i.e., primary metaphors)] which
complex metaphors either do or do not share” (Grady et al. 1996: 185).

7.2.2 Theoretical contribution to metaphor research in Classical Hebrew
To my knowledge, metaphor research in Classical Hebrew has developed up to this
point with minimal influence from Grady or PMT. For example, while King makes explicit
use of primary metaphors in his (2012) publication, he also explicitly cites Lakoff and
Johnson (1999: 45-58) as his source rather than Grady (King 2012: 34). A similar situation
seems to hold in other metaphor research in Biblical Hebrew. While most of the theoretical
work in this thesis is a mere juxtaposition of Grady’s ideas with those of Lakoff and
Johnson’s, the refinements that Grady proposed for Lakoff and Johnson’s framework of
CMT deserve to be heard in its application to metaphor research in Classical Hebrew.
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7.2.3 An application of Primary Metaphor Theory
Grady’s (1997a; etc.) work on primary metaphors has been widely appreciated
among metaphor theorists and researchers. However, there have not been many
applications of the theory to sets of examples such as what we have in King’s corpus, at
least not many that do so within a conscientiously PMT framework. While my work
remains cursory, it is still a valuable attempt to test a theoretical framework with real
linguistic data.

7.3

Future directions: A hypothesis using the notions of evaluation
and markedness
A significant strength of PMT is the priority that it gives to conceptual structures

arising from local experience-types. While valuable, there are still a host of other factors
influencing metaphorical thought and language. In considering areas for future research, I
would like to suggest, first, that the evaluative nature of primary source concepts such as UP
and UPRIGHT and their counterparts DOWN and PRONE be given greater attention; second, that
the markedness of one evaluative elaboration over the other be explored; third, that
implications of evaluation and markedness be considered for the relationship between
VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS in Classical Hebrew as

well as other languages.

I believe tentative suggestions can be made regarding each of these areas. First,
Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 14-21) have long noted the evaluative nature of what they called
orientational metaphors. In their work, they proposed the metaphor

GOOD IS UP; BAD IS

DOWN. While Grady (1997a) did not include that metaphor in his list of primary metaphors,

I have argued (see §5.5.1) for its plausibility as one. Krzeszowski (1993) has also explored
the evaluative nature of image schemas, but his arguments need to be supplemented.
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Supplying us with cultural and linguistic evidence, King “shows further contexts (the
Hebrew conception of the universe and discourse of distress) in which ‘up’ is viewed
positively and ‘down’ negatively” (2012: 101). I tentatively suggest that UP and UPRIGHT
can be viewed positively while DOWN and PRONE can be viewed negatively.
Second, Channell (2000: 55) and Hampe (2005: 89-90) indicate that “we [may be]
more acutely aware of negative connotations than of positive ones, both as participants in
verbal communication and as analysts” (Hampe 2005: 89-90). This suggests that negative
polarity is marked while positive polarity is not (see also Damasio (1994: 267) for a similar
perspective from a neuroscientist). Thus, DOWN and PRONE are marked while UP and UPRIGHT
are unmarked. Intuitively, a marked concept or situation captures our attention while an
unmarked concept or situation does not. If a person is upright, their attention will be drawn
to aspects of the scene that are most salient. The fact that it is good that they are upright is
not a salient aspect of that scene; instead, their attention may be drawn toward the ability that
they have in an upright position to achieve their goals (such as walking across the room and
retrieving a desired object). If another person pushes them and they fall down, their attention
is most likely drawn to the negativity of their situation more than to their particular lack of
ability to walk across the room without changing postures. If this is true, we could recast the
primary metaphor as BEING FUNCTIONAL/VIABLE IS BEING UPRIGHT; BAD IS BEING PRONE. If
we juxtapose this with GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN, then the negatively valued elaborations of
both

VERTICAL ELEVATION

and

UPRIGHTNESS

would map to the same target concept and

might even converge conceptually while the positively valued elaborations would remain
distinct. If such a hypothesis can be substantiated, then the framework of PMT in its current
state would need revision.
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Third, because King’s research focused on the negative elaborations of VERTICAL
ELEVATION

and

UPRIGHTNESS,

this hypothesis suggests that many of the examples in his

corpus either do not clearly determine which source concept is intended—VERTICAL
ELEVATION

or

UPRIGHTNESS—or

they do clearly reflect one or the other source concept,

but on a semantic level, they are interchangeable with language reflecting the other source
concept. While this may be readily observed in examples with negatively valued
metaphorical elaborations (e.g., 1QH 11:19-20), I have already pointed out in §5.4.2 that a
different situation seems to hold for positively valued elaborations. Perhaps Lakens (2012)
can be a starting point for research in these areas.
One of the aims of this thesis was to bring Grady’s contributions to metaphor theory
(i.e., PMT) to the fore so that we can see the influence it can have on current analyses.
While there certainly are many factors affecting the final product of metaphorical
expressions in the Hebrew Bible, Grady highlights the significant role that locally-defined
correlations in experience have on metaphorical thought and language. By reanalyzing
metaphors for distress from King’s corpus, this thesis shows significant ways that a theory
built around primary scenes and primary metaphors affects the analysis of linguistic data.
By giving attention to this piece of the puzzle of metaphor, we have been able to see the
bigger picture with more clarity and to gain insights that recent research has overlooked.
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